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ABSTRACT
Multiple Realization:
Fifty Years of Contesting Intuitions
by
YUEN Lok Hang
Master of Philosophy
The thesis is about Multiple Realization. Multiple realization is roughly the idea of a
higher level property being multiply realized by different lower level physical
properties. Philosophers usually argue that if a property is multiply realized, it is not
reducible to its realizers. Mobilized as such, multiple realization plays a central role in
what is usually called Non-Reductive Physicalism. Despite its popularity, and beyond
the hunches and intuitions that back the concept, seldom do philosophers consider the
nature of multiple realization. The central aim of the thesis is to tackle the somewhat
overlooked question: “what is multiple realization?” The rationale is that to find out
what philosophical tasks multiple realization can accomplish, we have to know what
multiple realization is.
The thesis proceeds as follow: In chapter 2, I’ll argue for a methodology for the entire
project in answering the question. I’ll argue that there are four desiderata we want from
any account of multiple realization, namely, Multiplicity, Naturalness, Physical
Realization, and Anti-Reductionism. We should look for an account of multiple
realization that could respect the four desiderata in a philosophically satisfactory way.
In chapter 3, I’ll look at the alleged origin of multiple realization, Jerry Fodor’s (1974).
I’ll reconstruct Fodor’s account of multiple realization. I’ll argue that the major bug of
Fodor’s account is his failure in respecting Physical Realization. In chapter 4, I’ll
examine Jaegwon Kim’s (1992) important critique of Fodor. I’ll argue that Kim’s
criticism can be reconstructed as an account of multiple realization that intentionally
violates Naturalness. In chapter 5, I’ll look at what I call the Causal Power Subset
View of multiple realization as suggested by some philosophers around the turn of the
21st century. I’ll reconstruct an account of multiple realization from their works and
argue that their account faces difficulties in reconciling Physical and AntiReductionism. I’ll further argue that their account nudges us toward a representational
reading of Anti-Reductionism, according to which our seeming commitment to the
higher level realized property is, in fact, a partial representation of a complex physical
state. In chapter 6, I develop the aforementioned suggestion into a fuller picture. I’ll
sketch a representational account of multiple realization and elucidate its plausibility.
One result of the thesis is that the desiderata motivating a theory of multiple realization
are in tight tension. One has to choose among them. My approach is no exception. I
choose to give up Anti-Reductionism and Naturalness, but, as a remedy, I attempt to
explain and make sense of the motivations and intuitions backing these two desiderata,
arriving at a picture that I am comfortable with, after traveling the long journey.
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Chapter 1 Introduction
There are many ways for something to be a mousetrap. An electronic mousetrap kills a
mouse with high-voltage shock. A traditional mousetrap snaps the mouse. There are
many ways for something to feel pain. We feel pain by being in some neurological state.
An alien may presumably feel pain by being in some alien “brain” state that is very
different from ours. At first approximation, philosophers call the relation between
mousetrap as such and different specific types of mousetraps, and pain and pain’s
various physical realizers Multiple Realization. Mousetrap is multiply realized by
traditional mousetraps, electronic mousetraps, and other types of mousetrap. Mental
states are multiply realized by human brain states, alien brain states, and possibly other
types of state. This thesis is about multiple realization.
Why are philosophers making a fuss over these otherwise mundane phenomena? Many
philosophers think that the multiple realization relation implies something
philosophically important about mousetraps, mental states, and other stuff that are
multiply realized. To see why they think so, we need a little background on how the
story evolved.
In philosophy of mind, there is a traditional debate concerning the relationship between
the mind and the physical world. Intuitively speaking, mental states like having a feeling
is extremely different from the things we find in the non-mental physical world. Rocks
have shape and mass but do not have feelings. The intuition is also captured by the
commonsensical view that a human being is not just constituted by its physical body.
We have a soul, so to speak. This consideration suggests that although both the mental
and the physical are equally real, they are drastically different as if the physical and the
mental are inhabitants of two distinct realms of reality.
This common-sensical position (usually called Dualism)1 is no longer popular among
contemporary philosophers. Philosophers now mostly endorse Physicalism, the idea,
very roughly, that the world is entirely physical. 2 If everything is physical, how about
Dualism is most notably defended by the early modern French philosopher René Descartes (1596-1650).
An overview of dualism can be found in chapter 2 of Heil’s (2013).
1
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In the thesis, I leave open the interpretation of “physical”. The notorious task of giving a non-trivial
1

the mental states with which we are familiar? An early form of physicalism simply
identifies mental states with physical states, claiming that, for example, feeling pain just
is being in some sort of physical state like “brain state X”.3
But many philosophers do not like this conclusion. And here comes the idea of multiple
realization. The idea is that there are many physical ways for something to feel pain,
ways other than that of being in brain state X. Being in brain state X is too narrow to
characterize pain. From this consideration, philosophers conclude that we cannot
identify pain with either one of the physical ways someone feels pain.4
Though, philosophers who are motivated by this multiple realization argument do not
usually want to give up Physicalism and return to Dualism. They want to maintain the
thesis that the world is entirely physical. To preserve the physicalist claim, philosophers
nowadays usually endorse the thesis that being in brain state X is “more basic than” the
state of being in pain. Hence we have the mainstream position now called “NonReductive Physicalism”, 5 with the “Non-Reductive” part characterizing the nonreductive claim that the mind is not identical to a specific physical state, while the
“Physicalism” part characterizes the physicalist claim that the world is entirely
physical.6
Multiple realization is part of the basic picture of Non-Reductive Physicalism. The idea
is that since there are many physical ways for something to feel pain, being in pain
cannot be “reduced to” any one of those physical ways of feeling pain. But since the
account of “physical” is intriguing and difficult, but that will be another story to tell (For the problem,
see, for example, Stoljar 2010).
This view is called “identity theory”. An overview of identity theory can be found in chapter 5 of Heil’s
(2013), as well as Smart’s (2017). It is worth mentioning that Smart is one of the most notable identity
theorists.
3

Why can’t we just identify pain with the disjunction of the ways in which things are feeling pain? I shall
not get into the detail of this disjunctive move now, since this is one of the issues that will be discussed
in the rest of the paper.
4

Non-Reductive Physicalism is now the dominant view concerning the mind’s place in the physical
world among philosophers. An overview of Non-Reductive Physicalism can be found in chapter 11 of
Heil’s (2013) and Baker (2009).
5

If physicalism is understood as the claim that everything is such that it is physical, it is contradictory to
postulate any non-physical entities, no matter how “intimately” they are related to the physical. Should
we rest on a less demanding notion of physicalism? What form of “physicalism” could multiple
realization theorist endorse? This is one of the issues this thesis investigates.
6
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realization relation is taken as a dependent relation, non-reductive physicalists think
that the realization relation vindicates the claim that those physical ways are still more
basic than feeling pain, and, in some sense,7 respecting the physicalist assumption that
the world is physical. From this perspective, multiple realization is supposed to do this
important philosophical work: illuminates and makes sense of Non-Reductive
Physicalism.
The story about the mind can be extended to many ordinary things, including
mousetraps. Multiple realization theorists think that the multiple realization lesson
learned in philosophy of mind is entirely general (Fodor 1974, Clapp 2001). If
something is multiply realized, that thing is not reducible yet physically acceptable. If
mousetrap is multiply realized, we can well be a non-reductive physicalist of
mousetraps. Mousetraps cannot be reduced to a specific form of mousetrap, for the same
reason why pain cannot be reduced to “being in brain state X”. As such, multiple
realization is even more important, as it not only illuminates the relationship between
the mental and the physical, but way beyond.
But what is multiple realization, after all? Given the important role multiple realization
is supposed to play, a satisfactory account of multiple realization is vital. We want to
know what multiple realization is and how it could do the philosophical works
aforementioned. It is one thing to find the saying “there are multiple ways for something
to be a mousetrap” intuitive, while it is another to spell out the philosophical details of
the multiple realization relation that could, in turn, shine a light on Non-Reductive
Physicalism. However, although the term has been gaining momentum in the NonReductive Physicalist literature once it was introduced in the 1970s, philosophers have
paid little attention to the question “what is multiple realization?” until recently. As
Jaegwon Kim remarks in a somewhat unnoticed paper:
[I]t is [...] remarkable that no one raised a serious question about what “realization”
meant, or should mean, while the term was gaining quick currency in philosophical
literature through the rest of the century, figuring in some of the most important
claims and arguments in philosophy of mind and philosophy of science.
(Kim 2010, 264)
Again, multiple realization theorists cannot endorse the claim that the world is entirely physical, if
they postulate non-physical higher level entities. See footnote 6.
7
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I share Kim’s view. We have to be serious about the nature of multiple realization, given
the important philosophical works it is supposed to do. The central aim of this thesis is
to look at this somewhat overlooked question: “What is multiple realization?”. The
undertaking is valuable in two ways. First, as explained, a satisfactory answer to the
question should illuminate what Non-Reductive Physicalism is.8 Second, focusing on
the question will enable us to appreciate some of the debates in the multiple realization
literature in a refreshing light: we will see that the gist of some disagreements between
multiple realization theorists lies in their disagreement over what multiple realization is.
But how are we to tackle the question? In chapter 2, I’ll introduce the framework of the
thesis. I’ll first explain why answering the question is not a straightforward task, given
the origin of multiple realization. I’ll then explicate and defend four constraints that any
account of multiple realization should satisfy, given the role philosophers want multiple
realization to play. They include Multiplicity, Naturalness, Physical Realization, and
Anti-Reductionism. These four desiderata will then be our testing criteria for any
account of multiple realization. An account of multiple realization should accommodate
and make sense of the four desiderata. Though, as the work proceeds, we will see that
the very act of looking after an account of multiple realization, in turn, clarifies the
nature of these four desiderata and illuminates how they are in tension with each other.
We may come to realize that, in the end, we have to make a choice among them.
With the framework introduced, I’ll look at Fodor’s (1974) in chapter 3, the alleged
origin of multiple realization. Though being praised as the origin of the notion,
philosophers have paid little attention to what Fodor’s account of multiple realization
is. I’ll do two things in this chapter: I’ll work out Fodor’s account of multiple realization
and argue that the major bug of the account is its failure to make sense of Physical
Realization.

Note that answering the question “what is multiple realization?” only partially illuminates NonReductive Physicalism. For, Non-Reductive Physicalism can be defined along other lines (e.g. in the
tradition of Functionalism). Though, I contend that multiple realization is one of the most important
notions that had mobilized Non-Reductive Physicalism in the late 20th century.
8
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In chapter 4, I’ll look at Kim’s (1992), one of the most important criticisms raised
against Fodor’s (1974). I’ll analyze Kim’s criticism with the aforementioned framework.
I’ll do four things in this chapter. First, I’ll argue that the gist of Kim’s criticism is to
exploit the bug of Fodor’s (1974), as identified in chapter 3. Second, I’ll argue that Kim,
by criticizing Fodor, has offered a different notion of multiple realization implicitly.
Kim’s account of multiple realization fails to respect Naturalness. However, this is
exactly intended by Kim: he wants to show that a notion of multiple realization that
respects Physical Realization and Multiplicity has to sacrifice Naturalness. Third, with
my interpretation, I’ll argue that the “official argument” in Kim’s (1992) has missed the
point, as it appears that Kim is not aware that his notion of multiple realization is
different from that of Fodor. Fourth, though missing the point, I’ll look into the official
argument and discuss some of its details, as they are relevant to the dialectics in the
subsequent chapters.
In chapter 5, I’ll look into the “Causal Power Subset” view of multiple realization, a
recently pursued strategy that attempts to break the Fodor-Kim stalemate. Again, under
my framework, I understand the strategy as an attempt to offer a notion of multiple
realization that could satisfy all desiderata. I’ll do three things in this chapter. First, I’ll
discuss the prospect of the strategy and show why it is considered a reply to Kim’s nonnaturalness charge, as identified in chapter 4. Second, I’ll argue that the causal power
subset view of multiple realization faces serious difficulties in making sense of Physical
Realization and Anti-Reductionism. I’ll further argue that what the causal power subset
view of multiple realization suggests, is a representational account of AntiReductionism according to which it is our way of representing a complex physical state
that gives us the seeming that there exists a higher level realized property. Third, I’ll
argue that the gist of the causal power subset account of multiple realization lies not on
the very notion of “causal powers”, despite its name.
In chapter 6, I’ll work on the aforementioned suggestion and attempt to offer a
representational account of multiple realization. I’ll sketch a picture of multiple
realization according to which multiple realization is primarily about features of our
representation of the world, instead of the world itself. I take multiple realization to be
a phenomenon in which a representational agent is switching between a finer way of
representing and a coarse-grained way of representing multiple types of partially similar
5

and partially different complex fundamental events. The picture I arrived at can be
regarded as my reflective equilibrium reached after the dialectics thus far developed.
There are real tensions among the desiderata of multiple realization, and make my
choice as well. I give up Anti-Reductionism and Naturalness. Though, I attempt to
explain and accommodate the motivations and intuitions that back these two desiderata.
I’ll then explicate the picture, and draw a connection to the multiple realization literature
by discussing Colin Klein’s (2008). Lastly, I’ll locate my representational picture of
multiple realization under an anti-level agenda. This chapter is exploratory and tentative,
pointing toward future refurbishment.
In chapter 7, I’ll conclude my thesis.

6

Chapter 2 Multiple Realization: Methodology
Background
The thesis tackles the question: “What is multiple realization?”. The question is
important, as the idea of multiple realization is being mobilized to do important
philosophical work: to make sense of the relationship between the higher level and the
lower level in the spirit of “non-reductive physicalism”. To evaluate whether multiple
realization can accomplish what it is supposed to do, we have to look at what multiple
realization is.
The question does not admit a simple and straightforward answer, for different reasons.
In this chapter, I’ll work out a method for answering the question.
Difficulties
There are two main difficulties in answering the question. First, unlike notions like
causation, time, morality, and the like, multiple realization is not a concept used in
ordinary life. We cannot anchor its meaning in ordinary usage. Multiple realization
seems to be a technical jargon introduced by philosophers with little real-life import.
Though, it is not the case that the notion appeals to no ordinary intuitions at all. As we
will see shortly, philosophers often mobilize familiar phenomena to explicate the idea
of multiple realization.
Second, although being a technical philosophical notion, multiple realization was not
introduced with an explicit definition in its origin. The two works that are taken to be
the root of multiple realization, Hilary Putnam’s (1967) and Jerry Fodor’s (1974), do
not even contain the phrase “multiple realization”. Hence, there is no way the “just look
at how it was stipulated” strategy works. Here I disagree with David Barrett, who argues
that multiple realization was defined with a clear role to play in Putnam’s and Fodor’s
work (Barrett 2018). The origin of multiple realization was fuzzy. There was no explicit
definition of multiple realization when the idea was formed.9 A better picture of the
Little attention has been paid to the history and origin of multiple realization. In the same paper I quoted
in the introduction, Kim deplored that when Putnam first used the term “physical realization” in the
9
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origin of multiple realization is that Putnam’s and Fodor’s work hinge on roughly
similar ideas and considerations that were then developed into the multiple realization
literature.
Multiple Realization: First Approximation
Apart from these difficulties, multiple realization is not usually introduced in an esoteric
or technical manner. Introductory statements of multiple realization are rather
straightforward. I have already introduced the idea with the example of a mousetrap in
chapter 1. To refresh:
Consider mental states like pain. Not only are humans capable of feeling pain.
Animals with different kinds of brain states can arguably be in pain as well. There
are many ways a physical body could experience pain. An alien with silicon-based
neuron chips could experience pain. Although pain is constituted by neurons in
humans, pain is constituted by silicon chips in aliens. Thus considered, pain is
multiply realized by different kinds of brain states. It seems that although
intimately related to and being depended upon our brain states, pain is different
from, and cannot be identified with our brain state.
This is a typical way of introducing multiple realization. Four points to note.
First, multiple realization is usually introduced via examples about mental states. This
is an understandable move, since multiple realization is a notion often deployed in the
philosophy of mind literature. Philosophers of mind use multiple realization to argue
for the non-reducibility of mental states. However, multiple realization is not a relation
special to the mind. Jerry Fodor, for example, intended his multiple realization lesson
to apply to the entire “special science”, not just psychology (1974). In this thesis, my
treatment of multiple realization does not hinge on any special consideration concerning
mental states.

context of functionalism, “it is somewhat remarkable that he offers no explanation of just what he had in
mind, apparently counting on the reader’s intuitive understanding of the term.” (Kim 2010, 264). I share
Kim’s view again.
8

Second, multiple realization is supposed to be a relation between “things”. The physical
things realize the mental things. Lower level things realize higher level things. But what
category of “things” are of interest to multiple realization theorists? In the literature,
most of the debates are couched in terms of property. Higher level properties are
multiply realized by lower level properties. The property being in pain is multiply
realized by the properties being in brain state X, being in silicon state D, and so on. A
potential problem is that the very notion of “property” involves complicated
metaphysical controversies and that the multiple realization literature is to a certain
extent unconnected to it. It is not even clear if multiple realization theorists are assuming
a single theory of property or not. Here I shall not dig into the long-lived debate
concerning properties. For simplicity’s sake, I shall assume the property talk in the
thesis, assuming that multiple realization is a relation between properties. Also, for the
sake of simplicity, I shall assume an abundant theory of property at the outset, since the
theory allows us to talk about disjunctive properties, an important notion that is
deployed in part of the multiple realization debate.
Third, a common saying is that if S is multiply realized by the Ps, S is holding a “oneto-many” or “same-but-different” relationship toward the Ps. This is captured in the
story of pain. The very same thing, being in pain, is said to be realized by many different
kinds of brain states. Thus, “same-but-different”, “one-to-many”. It also captures the
saying that multiple realization refers to a “cross-classification” situation between the
sciences. Suppose that pain is studied by psychology, and brain states by the brain
sciences. When pain is multiply realized by different brain states, the things
psychologists classify as having one single kind of property (pain) would be classified
into several different kinds as having different properties by the brain scientists, hence,
cross-classification.
Fourth, the realization relation is usually taken as an asymmetric dependency relation.
Being in pain depends upon being in a brain state, rather than the other way around.
Special scientific properties depend upon the lower level physical properties, not the
other way around. How this “dependency” relationship is spelled out is of controversy.
Specifying the dependency relationship will be part of the project of specifying what
multiple realization is. At this moment, I simply characterize this feature with the rough
claim that the realized property is dependent upon the realizing properties in some way.
9

This is a first approximation of the notion of multiple realization. I hope it is a rough
but useful sketch on capturing the general shape of multiple realization as to how it is
used in the literature. You may find the characterization not clear enough or open to
various interpretations. It is. And this is the reason why I am asking the question “what
is multiple realization?” It is the remainder of the thesis to specify and sharpen this first
approximation.
Method
Although I disagree with Barrett’s view on the origin of multiple realization, I share his
view that multiple realization is a notion mobilized to play certain philosophical roles
(2018, 675). As I have mentioned in the introduction, multiple realization was assigned
philosophical works. Multiple realization was supposed to illuminate the relationship
between the mental and the physical, under the spirit of Non-Reductive Physicalism.
We want multiple realization to show us how this is the case. In the following, I shall
explicate and defend four features that we want from multiple realization, such that any
account of multiple realization should attempt to respect and make sense of them in a
philosophically satisfying way.
My method of answering the question “what is multiple realization” consists of looking
into various accounts of multiple realization and evaluates the account according to the
four desiderata. We want an account of multiple realization that could make the most
sense of the four features in a philosophically satisfying way.10
In the next three chapters, I will look at three different accounts of multiple realization,
and consider their prospect in making sense of the desiderata. I will first look at Fodor’s
account of multiple realization as developed in his original (1974). I will then look at
Kim’s account of multiple realization in his (1992), which is meant to be a criticism of
Note that I ask for an account of multiple realization that could “make sense of” the four desiderata. In
stead of just “satisfying” them. The reason is that, as we shall see, the four desiderata of multiple
realization are themselves open to various interpretation, related to controversial philosophical issues.
My contention is that multiple realization is a notion originated from rough intuitions and imaginations.
Part of the job of having an account of multiple realization is to clarify and specify, in turn, what the four
desiderata are.
10

10

Fodor’s work. After that, I will look at the so-called “causal power subset” view raised
around the 2000s, which is meant to be a resolution to the aforementioned Fodor-Kim
debate. My take on the dialectic situation is that all three endeavors can be interpreted
as three different attempts to offer a notion of multiple realization. As we shall see, all
three accounts of multiple realization differ subtly, and, as a result, their accounts score
differently in terms of how well they are making sense of the four desiderata. I shall
show that it is the differences in their notion of multiple realization that mark their
disagreements. Hence, looking at the question “what is multiple realization” is a way of
illuminating the gist of the debates.
Though, as the work proceeds, we shall see that the task of looking for a correct account
of multiple realization in turn enables us to have a deeper understanding on the
desiderata itself. When we crave, we hear our desires clearer. One reason is that the
constraints themselves, too, admit philosophical controversies. This is ineradicable.
Non-reductive physicalism is in part motivated by vague and rough claims, claims in
need of clarification. Concepts involved in formulating the constraints like antireductionism, physicalism, naturalness, are all philosophically controversial, invoking
different controversial ideas. The project of searching for an account of multiple
realization, in turn, enables us to have a clearer view on how these concepts play against
each other, sometimes in philosophically interesting ways.
At the end of the thesis, we will see that all accounts of multiple realization I am looking
at, including the one I preferred, cannot fully satisfy the four desiderata in a
philosophically unproblematic way. It turns out that the four desiderata are in
irresolvable tension, that we have been driven by contradictory intuitions when thinking
about multiple realization. This is one of the results that the thesis has to offer. Again,
looking at the failed attempts helps us appreciate the philosophical complications
related to the desiderata, without which we will not be able to arrive at an informed
judgement as to which desiderata to treasure.
The situation is comparable to a wage earner who has in her mind a list of features that
she wants from her dream job. Her task is then to look for the job that could best match
her tastes. It may turn out that there is no actual job that could satisfy the desiderata.
But in her course of consecutive failure, she may have a deeper understanding of the
11

desiderata themselves. She may appreciate how the desiderata play against each other
in interesting ways. She may even start rethinking what she really wants, after all.
So, what do we want from multiple realization? And why?
Multiple Realization: Things that We Want
Suppose S is a higher level (interchangeably: special scientific) property that is multiply
realized by lower level physical properties P1, P2, … Pn. Any account of Multiple
Realization should make sense of the following four intuitive features: Multiplicity,
Naturalness, Physical Realization, Anti-Reductionism.
Multiplicity. There are at least two realizers P for any multiply realized property S.
That the realizing properties Ps are different from each other.
Multiplicity is required for multiple realization. This is nearly self-evident. Multiple
realization, by its name, suggests that the realizing properties be multiple, not one (recall the “one-to-many” characterization in our first approximation). Multiple realization
theorists stipulate that the single same mental property is realized by different physical
properties. Consider Louise Antony’s characterization of multiple realization: “one and
the same mental property can be realized in a variety of different physical properties …”
(2003, 1). Although it appears to be straightforward, Multiplicity admits interesting
interpretation and development when the debate evolved, as we shall see in chapter 5.
Naturalness. That the realized property S is a natural property.
Naturalness is required for multiple realization. One reason why philosophers love
multiple realization is that they want to show that the higher level properties are
scientifically legitimate. This is explicit in Fodor’s (1974). The sole point of his (1974)
is to show that the special sciences are picking out natural kinds that are not co-extensive
with a unified physical natural kind.
Caveat: Naturalness is formulated under different names among multiple realization
theorists. Fodor uses “natural kind” (1974), Kim uses “nomic kind”, or “kind” (1992),
12

though referring to the same idea (Kim refers explicitly to Fodor (1974)’s “naturalness”).
I said earlier that I adopt the “property talk” according to which multiple realization is
a relation between properties. Concerning this, the multiple realization literature does
not make a careful distinction between “natural kind” and “natural property”. There is
a tempting strategy to translate the “natural kind” talk into the “natural property” talk:
things are considered grouped into a natural kind by sharing a natural property. If jade
is a natural kind, it is because the jades are sharing the natural property being jade. I
believe that this mixed talk of natural property and natural kind in the multiple
realization literature is not as harmless as it seems.
One reason is that each notion, “natural kind” and “natural property”, assumes rather
independent literature in philosophy. “Natural property” is more in the vicinity
developed in David Lewis’s metaphysics, in which the idea of “perfectly natural
properties” plays an important role (1983). While the “natural kind” literature is more
in the vicinity developed in the philosophy of science, in the tradition of, most notably,
J.S. Mill, with problems and concerns that are quite different from that of the Lewisian
notion of natural property.11 I shall illustrate one possible divergence of natural kind
from natural property. According to some philosophers, objects fall into a natural kind
by sharing a cluster of co-occurring properties.12 Requiring a cluster of properties to
form a natural kind thus precludes the simple strategy that identifies a natural kind with
a natural property.
Unfortunately, the multiple realization literature does not seem to care about the
aforementioned complexity. When using the notion “natural”, the multiple realization
literature does not assume too much from either side of the tradition. For example,
Fodor understands natural kind (properties) in terms of scientific law in the form “X →
Y”, which he reads X “brings about” Y (1974, 98). Also, Fodor thinks that a natural
property must be mentioned in a scientific law (1974, 101-102). Kim, in his reply to

11

The difference is noted also By Cian Dorr in his (2019).

Alexander Bird and Emma Tobin call this position the Cluster Kind Realism, see (Bird and Tobin 2018).
One may argue that the view entails that, given an abundance theory of property, every two objects belong
to a natural kind, which, as a result trivializing the concept of natural kind. The cluster kind view, of
course, is way more complicated than the way I have put it. The view for sure have to avoid such
entailment. My point here is just to illustrate that the concept “natural kind” and “natural property” may
diverge.
12
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Fodor, has mostly accepted this light-weighted notion of naturalness, but has also added
a further characterization: that a natural property makes for similarity. If two things are
sharing a natural property, they are similar with respect to that natural property (1992,
13). As explicitly citing works from the Lewisian tradition, Kim’s similarity account of
naturalness is more in the Lewisian vein.
It should be mentioned that although the similarity characterization of natural properties
looks simplistic and straightforward, we shall see in later chapters that there are
potential confusions hidden beneath the simple claim that natural properties make for
similarity. For simplicity’s sake, and without going into the detail when the story has
not yet evolved, I shall inherit a light-weighted notion of naturalness from the
aforementioned consideration. I take it to be the case that a natural property plays a
central role in scientific laws and theory. Predicates used in scientific laws and theories
aim at referring to natural properties. Also, a natural property makes for similarity: when
two objects are sharing a natural property, they must be similar with respect to that
property.
Physical Realization. That S is physically realized by, and hence nothing over
and above the Ps.
Anti-Reductionism. That S is not reducible to the Ps.
The last two desiderata have to be displayed together, since an explication of each
depends upon the other. Physical Realization and Anti-Reductivism is to make sense of
“Non-Reductive Physicalism”, which, as I said earlier, is central to what multiple
realization optimists would like to conclude from multiple realization. We want a notion
of multiple realization that could fulfill this hybrid duty. To characterize Physical
Realization, one may refer to the following rough claims that, or “that S is physically
nothing over and above the Ps”, or “that S is metaphysically depended upon the physical
Ps”, etc. While to characterize Anti-Reductionism, one may refer to the rough claim that
“the S is not reducible to the physical Ps”, or “that we cannot identify the S with the
physical Ps”, or, that “S is something over and above the Ps”.13
I open to the possibility that an account of multiple realization can be developed not in line with a
broadly physicalist worldview. Suppose we take the world to be fundamentally mental or idealistic, it
13
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Two related worries emerge immediately. First, one may find the two claims, as I have
formulated them, too vague to be useful as desiderata. The second worry is that one may
doubt whether the two claims are compatible, once they are specified and clarified.
These are legitimate worries. Following Kim, one may be deeply troubled by the very
position of “Non-Reductive Physicalism”, an allegedly viable middle way between “not
reducing the mind to the physical stuff” and “the world is entirely physical”. Maybe
there is no middle way: Non-Reductive Physicalism looks compatible only because the
position is not precisely characterized.
I do not discharge the worries right away now, I postpone them. At least, I share Kim’s
worries and I am sympathetic to the idea that Non-Reductive Physicalism is too good
to be true. One reason I allow Physical Realization and Anti-Reductivism to be
formulated in such an unspecified way is that I do not want to rule out multiple
realization at the very beginning of the journey through which I am looking for a
successful account of multiple realization. If Physical Realization and Anti-Reductivism
are deemed contradictory, there is no account of multiple realization that could make
sense of both. But philosophers have been proposing accounts of multiple realization.
They want to reconcile the two claims. I contend that the very act of formulating an
account of realization and multiple realization is exactly to strive for a philosophical
satisfactory way of interpreting and disambiguating the two claims. An account of
multiple realization should show not only what Non-Reductive Physicalism is, but also
why it is plausible. After all, we shall evaluate whether multiple realization theorists are
successful in this regard.
Aren’t They Too Vague?
In general, some may worry that my formulation of the four desiderata is not specific
enough. I have characterized the four desiderata in a way that is open to various
interpretations. A reason is that I believe multiple realization is a notion revolving
seems that we can talk about multiple realization as well, by having higher level properties being multiply
realized by lower level mental properties. To accommodate such possibility, one may reconsider Physical
Realization as the claim that the higher level properties are realized by and hence nothing over and above
the lower level fundamental realizing properties. However, I shall assume a basically physicalist outlook
in this thesis, for, the multiple realization literature is to a large extent dominated by it.
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around various rough claims and intuitions (recall how multiple realization is usually
introduced by poking on our imaginations with examples like alien’s mind and
mousetraps). The four desiderata can better be seen as a group of rough considerations.
It is exactly via the exploration into the multiple realization debate that these
considerations are tested, contested, and clarified.
Hence, a rough characterization of the four desiderata is sufficient for the present
purpose. (And it is impossible to specify the desiderata further without going into a
specific account of multiple realization). To repeat my analogy, a job seeker looking for
a perfect job may have in her mind only a rough idea of what she wants. Through the
job-seeking process, she can specify her wants more clearly.
I do not think that any multiple realization theorists would find anyone of the desiderata
objectionable, other than the objection that they are not formulated specifically enough,
or in one’s preferred way.
Don’t We Want More?
Are there more common grounds? Are there any further things we want from multiple
realization? I consider two further possible desiderata, and explain why they are not as
central as the four aforementioned, and hence, not to be considered in the thesis.
Functionalism. That S is a functional property, and the Ps occupy the functional
role.
It is common to understand multiple realization as a sub-thesis of functionalism. This is
understandable, since multiple realization was a thesis developed in the tradition of
functionalism. Both Fodor and Putnam were considered functionalists when they
introduced multiple realization ideas in the 60s and 70s. Their multiple realization ideas
were also motivated in part by functionalist consideration (as Putnam acknowledged in
his subsequent (1975a)).
However, functionalism is not central to multiple realization. Fodor’s (1974) does not
rely on functionalism at all, although he was considered a functionalist of mental states.
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Unless one interprets Fodor as saying that every special scientific property is a
functional property, we have no reason to restrict his notion of multiple realization to
functional properties. Second, and more importantly, the subsequent debate of multiple
realization does not rely on the functionalist thesis, or so we shall see. Functionalism is
peripheral to multiple realization.
Explanation. That S is explained by the Ps.
It is also intuitive that when a mental state is realized by the brain states, the relation is
in part explanatory. The fact that I have brain states P at least partly explains the fact
that I have mental states S. To understand how we feel pain, we open the skull and see
how the inner workings of our brain contribute to the feeling of pain, so to speak.
Explanation is central to multiple realization. It is the fifth desiderata that we want from
multiple realization. However, in the rest of the thesis, I shall leave aside Explanation,
for a purely practical reason. The reason for not taking Explanation as the fifth
desiderata in this thesis is that the subsequent disagreement that I am interested in does
not hinge on Explanation. Nor does Explanation play against the four desiderata in any
significant way. Leaving out Explanation does not affect the story I am to tell.
Concluding Remarks
An account of multiple realization needs to make sense of Multiplicity, Naturalness,
Physical Realization, and Anti-Reductionism. The Fodor-Kim debate, as well as the
subsequent development, can be understood in this framework. My diagnosis of the
debate is that Fodor and Kim disagree because they disagree on what multiple
realization is. Their account of multiple realization disagrees because they disagree on
how the constraints should play against each other. Looking into the debate shall enable
us to better understand the four desiderata themselves. It is Fodor’s (1974) that I am
going to discuss.
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Chapter 3 Multiple Realization in Jerry Fodor’s (1974)
Background
Jerry Fodor’s (1974) “Special Science”14 is widely considered the locus classicus of
multiple realization. Philosophers often refer to the work when introducing the notion
(Polger and Shapiro 2016, 9). However, seldom do philosophers attempt to explicate
Fodor’s account of multiple realization. Few philosophers seem to be interested in what
Fodor is really getting onto in his (1974). This may be partly a result of the lack of
explicit definition in the work: the phrase “multiple realization” is not even used in the
text. Worse still, as we shall see, the work is open to various interpretations, which
results in some complications. These complications are not well appreciated.
I aim to work out what Fodor’s account of multiple realization is, and evaluate it
according to the four desiderata of multiple realization as presented in chapter 2. I start
with a section called preliminaries, where I will explain some important notions that
Fodor uses to formulate his account of multiple realization. I will then present Fodor’s
account of multiple realization, followed by my evaluation based on the four desiderata
introduced in chapter 2.
Preliminaries
In his (1974), Fodor argues against what he called “reductivism” of the special sciences,
which he understands as a combination of two claims: “token physicalism”, and the
claim that each natural property is co-extensive with a physical natural property. Fodor
rejects the latter claim, and hence he rejects (his version of) reductionism. The
considerations and claims he has raised in rejecting the claim, i.e. that each natural
property is co-extensive with a physical natural property, present to us a picture of
multiple realization, where I call it Fodor’s account of multiple realization.

In Fodor’s (1975) The Language of Thought, he includes in the introduction a restatement of his (1974).
It is obvious that the two are word-to-word copies of each other. I shall thereby focus solely on his (1974).
14
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In this section, I discuss some of the important terms that Fodor uses in his (1974).
These terms play an important role in understanding Fodor’s account of multiple
realization.
Predicates, Properties, and Kinds
First, I discuss how Fodor uses the term predicates, properties, and kinds. Fodor
explicates his view without making a careful distinction between predicate, property,
and kind. Fodor is explicit for his indifference. In the first footnote of the paper, he
indicates that he “shall permit [himself] some latitude in construing the relation between
properties and predicates” (1974, 114, fn1), since he is not at all interested in, at least in
this paper, the relation between predicates, properties, and kinds (1974, 114, fn1).
We can also trace his indifference in the text. For example, he switches between using
the notion “predicate” and the notion “kind”, in formulating very similar claims. In
expressing the claim that each natural property is co-extensive with a physical natural
property (recall, this is the claim that Fodor rejects), he switches between saying
“natural kind predicate in an ideally completed physics which correspond to each
natural kind predicate in any ideally completed special science” (1974, 100) and
“neurological natural kind co-extensive with psychological natural kind.” (1974, 105).
We see that in the first instance Fodor expresses the claim in terms of “natural kind
predicate”, while in the second instance he expresses the claim in terms of “natural
kind”.
For the sake of convenience, I shall leave Fodor’s indifferences aside, and follow the
“property” talk.
Events
Second, I consider Fodor’s use of events. Since Fodor formulates token physicalism in
terms of event identity, we need to understand his notion of events. Fodor seems to be
adopting an account of event available in his time, where an event is understood as
consisting of a particular object (or objects) instantiating a property (or properties) at a
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given time interval. The account is given in, for example, Jaegwon Kim’s (1966) (1966,
231-232).15
Event Identity
Third, I turn to Fodor’s notion of event identity. To preview, Fodor understands token
physicalism as the idea that every event is identical to a physical event. To make sense
of his notion of token physicalism, we need to first understand his notion of event
identity. Fodor warns us that “event identity” is not to be confused with “property
identity”:
Token physicalism is weaker than what might be called ‘type physicalism’, the
doctrine roughly, that, every property [...] is a physical property. Token physicalism
does not entail type physicalism because the contingent identity of a pair of events
presumably does not guarantee the identity of the properties whose instantiation
constitutes the event.
(Fodor 1974, 100; My emphasis)
In this passage, Fodor denies that property identity is a necessary condition for event
identity (with respect to the properties “whose instantiation constitutes the event”).
Fodor’s characterization of event identity contrasts sharply with that of Kim’s (1966).
According to Kim, two events are identical if and only if they consist of the same
particular (object) having the same property at the same time interval (Kim 1966, 232).
As the quoted passage suggests, Fodor thinks that property identity (among the object
at issue) is not necessary for the “identity of a pair of events”. Hence, to Fodor, it is
possible that the following happens: event e1 consists of object o instantiating property
X at t, while event e2 consists of object o instantiating property Y at t, where X is not
identical to Y, nonetheless, e1 is identical to e2.
Three more things to note.

A clue that Fodor endorse Kim’s notion of event is as follows: “Every event which consists of x’s
satisfying S1 is identical to some event which consists of x’s satisfying P1 and vice versa.” (Fodor 1974,
100). The “time” category is missing from Fodor’s account. This is not devastating, however. Since we
can plausibly presume that Fodor is always talking about the same time interval when considering cases
of events identity.
15
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First, after denying the necessity of property identity for event identity, Fodor does not
provide a positive account of event identity. This is problematic, as Fodor’s notion of,
and his endorsement of “token physicalism” depend directly on the notion of event
identity. He defines “token physicalism” as the thesis that every event is identical to a
physical event. However, without a positive account of event identity, we are not able
to assess the merits or demerits of Fodor’s account of token physicalism. This is a
problem I shall return to.
Second, although without a positive account, Fodor is focusing on instances of event
identity without property identity to develop his view, in his (1974). Fodor is
emphasizing situations where we have event identity without property identity.
Third, and most importantly, Fodor’s rejection of Kim’s account of event identity is
radical. It is intuitively implausible that two events are identical without their
constituting properties being identical. It is also intuitively implausible to say that the
event consisting of me experiencing pain at t is identical to the event consisting of me
having mass m at t. But it appears that Fodor’s account allows such possibility.
In sum, Fodor’s incomplete account of event identity and his radical rejection of Kim’s
account of event identity constitute a major gap in his account of multiple realization
(1974).
Physical Events
Next, I turn to Fodor’s notion of a physical event. Nowhere in the text could we find
Fodor’s definition of a physical event, although he bases his entire notion of token
physicalism on it. One expedient interpretation is that since an event is understood in
terms of an object having a property, an event is physical in virtue of the object at issue
having a physical property. I contend that this is an apt interpretation of Fodor, since he
has been using “physical predicate” and “physical kind” in the text.
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Token Physicalism
Next, I turn to Fodor’s notion of token physicalism. As mentioned, token physicalism is
the thesis that every event is a physical event. This depends on Fodor’s notion of event,
event identity (though incomplete), and physical events.
As addressed, the absence of a positive account of event identity precludes an
unproblematic understanding of token physicalism. But we can say what Fodor’s
account of token physicalism allows, given his rejection of Kim’s account of event
identity.
Fodor’s account of token physicalism allows there to be non-physical properties. All
that is required, if Fodor’s token physicalism is true, is that every event be identical to
a physical event. It does not further require that every property is identical to a physical
property. As I have mentioned, it is cases where property identity is not forthcoming
(while still having event identity), that Fodor is emphasizing in his (1974). Fodor is
emphasizing on the existence of non-physical properties.
Some may promptly react that this is not physicalism at all, since Fodor’s version of
token physicalism gives space to non-physical properties. I contend that the verdict is
correct. What appears to me in Fodor’s (1974) is a form of property dualism. I shall
address the issue again in this chapter.
Naturalness
Finally, I turn to Fodor’s notion of naturalness. As slightly mentioned in chapter 2, the
multiple realization literature has not adopted a clear definition of naturalness. Fodor is
not an exception, given his indifferent attitude to rigorous definitions in his (1974). He
happily adopts a circular definition of natural property (1974, 101-102).16 For Fodor, a
property is natural if the property plays a role in a scientific law. And Fodor admits that

Again, I emphasize here that Fodor is not making a distinction among “natural predicate”, “natural
kind”, and “natural property” (although he mainly uses the former two notions). This is just the result of
his indifference to the distinction between predicate, property, and kind.
16

22

he is not able to formulate a notion of scientific law without relying on the notion of
natural kind, hence, we have a circular definition of naturalness.17
It should be emphasized that although a non-circular account of naturalness is not
forthcoming, it does not affect much of the complication concerning Fodor’s account
of multiple realization.
With the preliminaries explicated, I now turn to Fodor’s account of multiple realization.
Fodor’s Account of Multiple Realization
Here is a reconstruction of Fodor’s notion of multiple realization, followed by an
elaboration. Let S be a special scientific property18, and let P1, P2 … Pn be physical
properties, such that S is multiply realized by the Ps.
(F1) Each Pn is different from the others.
(F2) S plays a role in a scientific law, hence, S is a natural property.
(F3) Every event involving19 S is a physical event. Some events involving S are
identical to events involving P1, some events involving S are identical to events
involving P2, and so on for all the Ps.

It is interesting whether Fodor has offered anything further in characterizing his notion of naturalness.
For example, in characterizing special scientific laws, he allows those laws to have exceptions (1974,
112). Further, it may be argued that Fodor adopts some form of a similarity account of naturalness, i.e.
that a natural property makes for similarity. This is a result of his uses of notions like “type homogeneous”
and “type heterogeneous” in talking about psychological states and neurological states (1974, 107). That
Fodor has indicated a form of similarity account of natural property is important, as it is the similarity
account of natural property that is emphasized in Kim’s (1992) when Kim replied Fodor.
17

The question “what is a special scientific property?” is open to various interpretations, very much like
the question “what is a physical property?” Fodor does not address the issue. For simplicity, I take Fodor’s
notion of special scientific property to be the properties that are the reference of predicates used in the
special sciences. Example of special sciences includes psychology and economics, which, in turn, are the
two major examples mobilized by Fodor.
18

Recall, an event is understood as an object or objects having a property or some properties at a certain
period. Property S is involved in an event e if S is one of the properties that is instantiated by the object
at issue in event e. To use Fodor’s phrase, S is involved in e if S is one of “the properties whose
instantiation constitutes the event”.
19
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(F4) S is not identical to any one of the Ps.
(F5) S is not identical to the disjunction of the Ps.
(F1) is endorsed by Fodor. Clearly, this is the multiplicity claim, the claim that the higher
level special scientific property is multiply realized by different physical realizing
properties. Here in Fodor’s (1974) we see one of the origins of this multiplicity claim.
Consider the following passage:
I am willing to believe that […] any event which consists of a monetary exchange
[…] has a true description in the vocabulary of physics […] But banal
considerations suggest that a description which covers all such events must be
wildly disjunctive. Some […] involve strings of wampum. Some involve dollar
[…]
(Fodor 1974, 103)
Fodor states that the physical description of a special scientific event, for example, the
economic event “monetary exchange” is “widely disjunctive”, and lists out some of the
different physical “realizers” of monetary exchange. I think there is no interpretation
problem in suggesting that Fodor endorses (F1).20
Fodor takes (F2) to be obvious (1974, 103). Just look at the special sciences, Fodor tells
us, they are discovering properties that are partaking in counterfactual-supporting
generalizations. The example Fodor used in the work is Gresham’s law in economics.
Since Fodor adopts a simple view concerning naturalness: that a property is natural if it
plays a role in a natural law, it is of no dispute that Fodor endorses (F2).
The first part of (F3) is a result of Fodor’s view on event and token physicalism, as
previously introduced. According to Fodor’s token physicalism, every event is identical
to a physical event. Fodor endorses token physicalism. This is respected by the first part
of (F3): that every special scientific event21 is identical to a physical event.

The only problem is that Fodor is talking about different “physical predicates”, instead of property.
However, as I have emphasized, his indifference indicates that he does not care about making a distinction
between predicate, property, and kind.
20

Just as we don’t have a clear account of how an event is physical, we don’t have a clear account of how
an event is special scientific. I adopt the following simplistic explanation, much like the one I adopt for
a physical event: an event is special scientific if the object at issue has a special scientific property.
21
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The second part of (F3) claims that some event involving S is identical to some event
involving P1, and some event involving S is identical to some event involving P2, and
so on for all of the realizers, i.e. the Ps. This pairing of events is the core of Fodor’s
account of multiple realization. The realized property S is holding such a “one-to-many”
relation to the realizing Ps, in the fashion of event identity. Fodor’s mobilization of the
example of monetary exchange is one instance of (F3): every event of monetary
exchange is identical to a physical event. Some events of monetary exchange are
identical to a physical event that involve wampum, some events of monetary exchange
are identical to a physical event that involve the dollar, and so on for every physical
realizer of monetary exchange. I also take it to be uncontroversial that Fodor is
endorsing (F3) in (1974).
(F4) says that the realized property S is not identical to its realizer P. The reason I take
(F4) to be part of Fodor’s account of multiple realization is a result of the complication
I introduced in the previous section, where Fodor’s notion of event and event identity
is explained. As mentioned, although Fodor requires every event to be identical to a
physical event, he does not require that in such instances of event identity, the properties
involved are identical.
As I have mentioned, Fodor is emphasizing instances where such property identity is
not forthcoming, despite event identity. Fodor asks us to consider instances where we
have event identity without property identity. Since I read Fodor’s (1974) as an attempt
to give us a picture of multiple realization, and given that Fodor is emphasizing
instances where (F4) obtains, I infer that (F4) is part of Fodor’s account of multiple
realization.22
(F5) further claims that S is not identical to the disjunction of the Ps. Among the five
claims, (F5) is the least obvious claim endorsed by Fodor in his (1974). Though, we
have good evidence from Fodor’s (1997) that (F5) is part of Fodor’s account of multiple
realization. To explain the complication, consider the following passage from his (1974):
One may argue that Fodor is endorsing (F4) in a more straightforward way: that the point of having a
notion of multiple realization is exactly to endorse (F4), the denial of the identical theorist’s claim that
the higher level S is identical to its physical base.
22
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Gresham’s law says something about what will happen in monetary exchanges
under certain conditions. I am willing to believe that […] any event which consists
of a monetary exchange […] has a true description in the vocabulary of physics
[…] But banal considerations suggest that a description which covers all such
events must be wildly disjunctive. Some […] involve strings of wampum. Some
involve dollar […] What are the chances that a disjunction of physical predicates
which cover all these events […] expresses a physical natural kind? […] what is
interesting about monetary exchanges is surely not their commonalities under
physical description.
(Fodor 1974, 103-104)
Fodor denies that the disjunction of the physical predicates picks out a natural property
by asking the rhetorical question: “what are the chances that a disjunction of physical
predicates which cover all these events expresses a physical natural kind?” There are
two ways to interpret this rhetorical question.
The first interpretation23 is that the disjunction of physical predicate does not pick out a
physical natural property, nor does it pick out a physical non-natural property. Instead,
it picks out a non-physical natural property, which, in turn, is also picked out by the
special scientific, in this case, economic predicate. In this picture, both the economic
predicate and “the disjunction of physical predicates which cover all these events” pick
out the same property, namely, the non-physical natural property being in a monetary
exchange. If this is the correct interpretation, then (F5) has to be dropped. For, under
such interpretation, there is no extra property referred to by the disjunction of the
realizing predicate Ps, such that it is different from the property referred to by the special
scientific predicate “S”. For, both predicates, “P1 or P2 or…Pn” and “S”, refer to the
same property, i.e. S.
The reason I find the first interpretation problematic is that Fodor is not carefully
distinguishing the predicate talk and the property talk. I don’t think that Fodor is making
such a subtle point, as seems to be assumed by the first interpretation. The first
interpretation requires that some physical predicates pick out some physical properties,
but some disjunctive physical predicates do not. This is not a point easy to retrieve from
the work, given his careless use of “predicate” and “property”.

23

Credit is given to Dan Marshall for suggesting this interpretation.
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The second interpretation, the one that I preferred, is that the disjunction of physical
predicate does pick out a physical property, but this physical property is not natural.
Under this interpretation, the rhetorical question asked in the passage is to bring us to
the conclusion that the physical disjunctive property is not natural. Suppose we adopt
this interpretation. Since, according to (F2), S is a natural property, but, according to the
quoted passage, the disjunction of the Ps is not a natural property, they cannot be the
same property, for, if S and the disjunctive property is identical, they cannot be both
natural and non-natural. Hence, (F5).
Although it is not clear in Fodor’s (1974) that he endorses (F5), he endorses the claim
in Fodor’s (1997) explicitly. Since his (1997) is an attempt to object Kim’s (1992)
objection to his original (1974), it is clear that (F5) has always been part of the picture
of multiple realization as presented in (1974). In his (1997), he writes:
Functionalists are required to deny that pain is identical to the disjunction of its
realizers. The reason they are is that it’s part of their story that the functional
property realized, but not its physical realizer, is projectable. (Fodor 1997, 155)
In denying the realized pain is identical to the disjunction of pain’s realizers, this
passage clearly shows that (F5) is part of Fodor’s account of multiple realization.
Note that by having claim (F5) in his picture of multiple realization, Fodor is endorsing
the controversial view that there can be non-identical necessarily co-extensive
properties. Fodor asks us to consider all actual and possible events where S is
instantiated, 24 where different physical properties are co-instantiated. Take all of these
possible and actual co-instantiated properties, disjoin them, and we have the “widely
disjunctive predicate”. The disjunctive property, therefore, is necessarily co-extensive
with S. But according to (F5), they are not identical. Hence, Fodor is, intentionally or
unintentionally, committing to the claim that there can be non-identical necessarily coextensive properties.

That Fodor is thinking about all actual and possible realizers of S is inferred from p.105, where he
states that it seems increasingly likely that there are nomologically possible system other than organism
[…] which satisfy natural kind predicates in psychology, and which satisfy no neurological predicates at
all” (1974, 105).
24
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The Four Desiderata
How successful is Fodor’s account of multiple realization in making sense of the four
desiderata? Let’s recall the desiderata and consider each.
Multiplicity. There are at least two realizers P for any multiply realized property S.
That the realizing properties Ps are different from each other.
Naturalness. That the realized property S is a natural property.
Physical Realization. That S is physically realized by, and hence nothing over and
above the Ps.
Anti-Reductionism. That S is not reducible to the Ps.
Multiplicity is arguably satisfied. From (F1), there are multiple physical properties that
realize the realized property. The realizing Ps are different, by stipulation.
Naturalness is arguably satisfied. From (F2), the realized special scientific property S
is stipulated to be a natural property. As mentioned, Fodor takes the naturalness of S to
be obvious.
Anti-Reductionism is arguably satisfied. For sure, Fodor believes that a consequence of
his view is anti-reductionism. Fodor simply defines reductionism as token physicalism
plus the claim that every natural property is co-extensive with a physical natural
property. Since he rejects the latter claims, he rejects reductionism. But how does his
account of multiple realization shows that it is not the case that every natural property
is co-extensive with a physical natural property? Clearly, by (F3). According to (F3),
each multiply realized property is co-instantiated with at least one physical property.
And if we consider all of the actual and possible realizers of S, the disjunction of all of
these realizers is a physical property that is necessarily co-extensive with S. And Fodor
thinks that this disjunctive property is not natural because the disjuncts are “widely
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heterogeneous” (recall the rhetorical question Fodor asked). Hence, it is not the case
that every natural property is co-extensive with a physical natural property.25
Suppose we take a simpler route and understand reductionism in terms of property
identity, i.e. if the realized property is identical to the realizing properties, the former is
reduced to the latter. Fodor’s account also scores well in this regard. Since Fodor rejects
the identification of S with Ps, according to (F4), and with the disjunction of the Ps,
according to (F5), S is not reducible to the physical realizers by the route of property
identity. Anti-Reductionism, therefore, is arguably respected in Fodor’s account of
multiple realization.
Physical Realization, however, is arguably not satisfied. Recall, Physical Realization
requires that an account of multiple realization should show that the realized property
is “nothing over and above” the physical realizing properties. One way to understand
the “nothing over and aboveness” claim is that S is identical to the realizing Ps. However,
this is not forthcoming in Fodor’s multiple realization. Fodor denies S be identical to
any one of the Ps, or the disjunction of the Ps, according to (F4) and (F5). This precludes
a simple way for Fodor’s multiple realization to respect Physical Realization by
endorsing the claim that every realized property is identical to a physical property.
As I have explained, Fodor’s account of token physicalism leaves room for non-physical
properties, and that he is emphasizing such non-physical properties in his (1974). If this
is the case, Fodor seems to be endorsing a kind of property dualism, where physical
properties and non-physical properties are playing their respective role on par with each
other. What Fodor requires is only that all events are physical. But without a clear
account on how events could be identical, and given his emphasis on there being nonphysical properties, I don’t see how Fodor’s account of multiple realization could make
sense of, or at least, explicate the claim that the higher level non-physical S is nothing

Note that this conclusion does not depend on (F5). Even if the first interpretation of Fodor’s rhetorical
question is correct, it remains that it is not the case that every natural property is co-extensive with a
physical natural property. According to the first interpretation, the widely disjunctive predicate does not
pick out any physical property at all, natural or non-natural. As a result, the special scientific natural
property is not co-extensive with a physical natural property, for, we don’t even have a physical property
at issue. Therefore, it vindicates the claim that it is not the case that every natural property is co-extensive
with a physical natural property.
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over and above the lower level physical Ps. Physical Realization is not respected in
Fodor’s account of multiple realization.
To exemplify the issue. Consider again the passage where Fodor is discussing
Gresham’s law:
I am willing to believe that physics is general in the sense that it implies any event
which consists of a monetary exchange (hence any event which falls under
Gresham’s lam) has a true description in the vocabulary of physics and in virtue
of which it falls under the laws of physics.
(Fodor 1974, 103)
That any event has a true physical description is a result of Fodor’s view on token
physicalism. But note that Fodor does not require that this true physical description be
a complete description of reality. As discussed, Fodor allows the multiply realized
property to be not identical to its realizers, not even the disjunction of the physical
realizers. Reality consists of properties that are not described by the physical description
that picks out only physical properties. Fodor’s token physicalism opens room for nonphysical properties.
But are there any further characterizations, given by Fodor, to characterize the
relationship between the S and the Ps, so that it could make sense of the claim that S is
nothing over and above the Ps? Although Fodor does not state it explicitly, I contend
that he endorses a minimal claim that the realizing Ps necessitates S. This is because in
one place Fodor takes the relation between the S and the disjunction of the Ps in the
form of a bi-conditional (1974, 108), where if the disjunctive property is instantiated,
so as S. Though, Fodor does not explicitly state the claim that the realization relationship
is a form of metaphysical dependence, where the realizing P necessitates and determines
the realized S, as it is now usually assumed.
Beyond that, Fodor is not clear on the relationship between the S and the Ps. In one
place, Fodor is quite dismissive about the relationship between the S and the Ps. He
states that whatever the physical properties Ps are, they have nothing to do with the
confirmation of the generalization that involves S (Fodor 1974, 103). From this, Fodor
seems to be suggesting that S is correlating with the Ps in an unpredictable and brute
way. But in another place, Fodor thinks that the Ps indeed have something to do with S.
30

By looking at the Ps, we “explicate the physical mechanisms” by which things fall into
the generalization that involves S (Fodor 1974, 107).
Since no explicit and clear views could be extracted from Fodor’s work that could
illuminate the relation between the S and the Ps, and that it is obvious that Fodor is open
to the charge of property dualism, it is safe to conclude that Fodor’s account of multiple
realization does not satisfactorily respect Physical Realization.
Notwithstanding the defect, we can now appreciate the trade-off between AntiReductionism and Physical Realization. The denial of the identity of the realized and
realizing property is what makes Fodor’s account of multiple realization satisfying AntiReductionism. However, it also opens room for non-physical properties, and as a result,
Physical Realization is undermined.
Concluding Remarks
The major bug of Fodor’s account of multiple realization is that it does not respect
Physical Realization. I also take this to be the central disagreement between Fodor and
Kim, although not explicit. As we shall see, the gist of Kim’s (1992) criticism of Fodor
lies here, to which I shall now turn.
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Chapter 4 Multiple Realization in Jaegwon Kim’s (1992)
Background
With almost 20 years of fermentation, the notion of multiple realization had proliferated.
Philosophers were much familiar with the idea that mental states have a wide range of
physical “realizers”, that “implement” or “realize” the mental state (Kim 1992, 1).
Jaegwon Kim’s (1992) “Multiple Realization and the Metaphysics of Reduction” is an
important challenge to multiple realization optimists, as he argues that if we look closer
to what multiple realization is, we should conclude that the realized property is not
natural, contrary to the contention of multiple realization theorists.
I appreciate Kim’s challenge from a slightly different starting point. What I first see in
Kim’s (1992) is an account of multiple realization that is different from that of Fodor’s
(1974). In the previous chapter, I showed that Fodor’s account of multiple realization
fails to make sense of Physical Realization. I interpret Kim’s (1992) as an attempt to
offer a different account of multiple realization that fixes this bug. But fixing this bug
renders naturalness problematic. This, however, is intended by Kim.
Some may find my strategy in interpreting Kim’s (1992) a bit odd. Kim is highly critical
of multiple realization. Isn’t it strange to say that Kim is looking for a satisfactory
account of multiple realization, as the way I conceived? I admit that this move is not
straightforward. But note that I am not saying that Kim himself is looking for a
satisfactory account of multiple realization. I say, instead, that Kim’s (1992) can be
interpreted as offering an account of multiple realization. And this is not an outrageous
move. Kim does in fact rely on a notion of multiple realization in his (1992), he takes
his notion of multiple realization to be representative of the multiple realization
literature in his time. It is only that he concludes that such an account of multiple
realization has some bad consequences. To put Kim in my framework in another way, I
see Kim as arguing for the following point: having an account of multiple realization
that satisfying Multiplicity and Physical Realization has to give up naturalness.
In the following, I shall first present Kim’s account of multiple realization, followed by
an evaluation according to the four desiderata of multiple realization. Next, I will argue,
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from such considerations, why the official argument in Kim’s (1992) misses the point.
Although missing the point, I shall discuss Kim’s official argument, as part of it is
relevant to the dialectics of the next chapter.
Kim’s Account of Multiple Realization
Here is a reconstruction of Kim’s account of multiple realization, followed by an
elaboration. Let S be a special scientific property. Let P1, P2 … Pn be physical properties,
such that S is multiply realized by the Ps.
(K1) Each Pn is significantly different from the others.
(K2) S is identical to the disjunctive property with the Ps as the disjuncts, i.e. <P1
or P2 or … Pn>.
(K3) If the disjuncts are significantly different, the disjunctive property formed is
not a natural property.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------(K4) <P1 or P2 or … Pn> is not a natural property.

(K1), (K3)

(K5) S is not a natural property.

(K2), (K4)

Kim endorses (K1). Kim takes the physical realizing properties to be “wildly disjunctive”
(1992, 15), a phrase that is similar to that of Fodor. Again, that the realizers are different
is the sole point of multiple realization. Though, note that Kim requires that the realizing
Ps be significantly different from each other, instead of being different, simpliciter. This
is a point to which I shall return in later sections of this chapter.
Kim endorses (K2). Kim has presumed in his (1992) a much stronger relationship
between S and the Ps than that of Fodor:
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The talk of realization is not metaphysically neutral: the idea that mental properties
are “realized” or “implemented” by physical properties carries with it a certain
ontological picture of mental properties as derivative and dependent. There is the
suggestion that when we look at concrete reality there is nothing over and beyond
instantiations of physical properties and relations...
(Kim 1992, 5-6)
And hence comes the crucial point: Kim identifies S with the disjunction of its realizer:
Pain is said to be a second-order property in that it is the property of having some
property with a certain specification in terms of its causes and effects…
(Kim 1992, 15)
On the assumption that Nh, Nr, Nm are all the properties satisfying specification H,
the property of having [the second-order] property with H, namely, pain, is none
other than the property of having either Nh or Nr or Nm …
(Kim 1992, 15; my emphasis)
Kim takes S as a second-order property none other than the disjunction of having either
“P1, P2, … Pn” for all the Ps that are the realizer of S. S is the disjunctive property <P1
or P2 or … Pn>.
Kim endorses (K3), and he thinks that what divides him and Fodor is that Fodor,
although endorses (K3), lacks an independent reason to support (K3) (1992, 10). In the
rest of his paper, Kim dedicates himself to the task of offering reasons to support (K3).
(K4) follows validly from (K1) and (K3).
(K5) follows validly from (K2) and (K4).
(K5) is exactly what Kim wants us to conclude from the fact that S is multiply realized:
that S is not natural.
If pain is nomically equivalent to N, the property claimed to be wildly disjunctive
and obviously non-nomic, why isn’t pain itself equally heterogeneous and nonnomic as a kind?
(Kim 1992, 15)
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It is difficult to see how one could have it both ways—that is, to castigate Nh, Nr,
Nm as unacceptably disjunctive while insisting on the integrity of pain as a
scientific kind.
(Kim 1992, 15)
The Four Desiderata
How successful is Kim’s account of multiple realization in making sense of the four
desiderata? Let’s recall the desiderata and consider each.
Multiplicity. There are at least two realizers P for any multiply realized property S.
That the realizing properties Ps are different from each other.
Naturalness. That the realized property S is a natural property.
Physical Realization. That S is physically realized by, and hence nothing over and
above the Ps.
Anti-Reductionism. That S is not reducible to the Ps.
Multiplicity is satisfied. From (K1), the realizing properties are stipulated to be
significantly different from the others.
Physical Realization is arguably satisfied. (K2) is intended to render S “nothing over
and above” the Ps, as S is identified with the disjunction of the physical properties Ps.
This is what I take to be the gist of Kim’s divergence from Fodor. In the previous chapter,
I showed that Fodor’s account of multiple realization is defective in the sense that it
does not make much sense of Physical Realization. (K2) fixes this bug. (K2) specifies
what the realization relation between S and the P is: S is a second-order disjunctive
property of the Ps.
There are two ways in which Kim’s account makes sense of the claim that the realized
property is physically nothing over above the realizing physical property.
First, a disjunctive property is usually considered metaphysically dependent upon the
disjuncts. Necessarily, if one of the disjuncts of a disjunctive property is instantiated, so
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is the disjunctive property. Further, the instantiation of the disjunctive property seems
to be metaphysically explained by the instantiation of the disjuncts. If the realized
property is identified with the disjunctive property with the disjuncts being its realizers,
there is a sense in which the realized property is metaphysically dependent upon the
realizers.
Second, though being a second-order property, the disjunctive property is arguably
physical: presumably, if all of the disjuncts of a disjunctive property are physical, the
disjunctive property itself is physical as well. Since the realizing properties are by
assumption physical, the disjunctive property with them as disjuncts will also be
physical as well. Hence, Kim’s account of multiple realization is compatible with a
physicalist claim that every property is physical, for it leaves no room for any multiply
realized non-physical properties.
(K2) directly contradicts (F5), the claim that the realized S is not identical to the
disjunction of the realizers. This marks the crucial difference between Fodor’s account
of multiple realization and that of Kim’s. Fodor’s account of multiple realization allows
the existence of non-physical multiply realized property. Kim requires that every
multiply realized property be identified with the disjunction of its physical realizing
properties, eliminating any possibility of a multiply realized non-physical property.
Anti-Reductionism is being respected only in a weaker sense when compared with
Fodor’s account of multiple realization. Again, if we assume that identity is sufficient
for reduction, Kim’s account of multiple realization cannot maintain that S is not
reducible to any physical property. For S is identical to the disjunction of the physical
Ps. And as mentioned, a disjunction of physical properties is presumably itself a
physical property. Hence, S is reducible to a physical property. What can still be
maintained, however, is that S is not reducible to any one of the particular realizers. In
other words, Kim’s account of multiple realization could maintain that the disjunctive
property is not reducible to any one of the disjuncts.
Whether this line of thought is “genuinely anti-reductionist” is contestable. A stronger
form of anti-reductionism may require that S be non-reducible to any physical property,
disjunctive or not. To them, Kim’s account of multiple realization does not satisfy anti36

reductionism. This could just be a verbal dispute on how the term reductionism is used.
Though, we can see that there is a real difference between Kim’s account of multiple
realization and Fodor’s account of multiple realization. According to Fodor’s account
of multiple realization, since S is not identified with the disjunction of Ps, Fodor could
maintain that S is not identical to any physical property.
Now we further see how Physical Realization plays against Anti-Reductionism, once
the realization relation is specified. Once the S is strongly tied to the Ps (in Kim’s case,
identified with the disjunction of the Ps), Anti-Reductionism is weakened. This is
understandable since both desiderata concern the relation between the higher level S
and the lower level Ps. Physical Realization is motivated by considerations that urge us
to tighten the relationship (so that S is physically realized), while Anti-Reductionism is
motivated by considerations that urge us to loosen the relationship (so that S is notreducible). When we are pushed to one side, we lose grip on the other. Or, when we
specify one claim, we thereby constrain how the other claim could be interpreted.
Naturalness is not satisfied. (K5) explicitly indicates the non-naturalness of S,
following from the claim that S is a disjunctive property and that a disjunctive property
is not natural. We see how Naturalness plays against other constraints as well. The fact
that the realizing Ps are “widely heterogeneous”, as required by Multiplicity, and the
fact that we tighten the relationship between the S and the Ps, as required by Physical
Realization, we are in a harder position to make sense of the Naturalness of S. This is
intended by Kim. Kim wants to show that if a property is multiply realized, it is not
natural. From my framework, we can translate Kim’s criticism of multiple realization:
an account of multiple realization that satisfies Multiplicity and Physical Realization
has to give up naturalness.
How Kim’s “Official Argument” Misses the Point
With the materials covered, we are in a position to see why Kim’s “official” argument
in (1992) obscures what I take to be the gist of his disagreement with Fodor. The official
argument of Kim is that if more attention is paid to the independent reasons behind (K3),
we can see why (K5) follows.
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Note that Kim presumes that Fodor endorses (K3). But Kim’s official tactic is to argue
that if Fodor and his allies could work harder to think about independent reasons of why
(K3) holds, i.e. why the disjunctive property (with the realizers being different disjuncts)
is not natural, then they can come to realize that the special scientific properties are, too,
non-natural. And so, the major chunk of Kim’s (1992) is to provide three reasons in
supporting (K3).
But this tactic misses the point: to establish the desired conclusion (K5), Kim doesn’t
even need independent reasons to show that (K3) is the case. Since Kim assumes that
Fodor endorses (K3), the force of Kim’s criticism does not come from whether we have
any further reason to believe in (K3). Instead, the real divergence lies in (K2), the thesis
identifying S with the disjunction of the Ps. It is (K2) that divides Kim and Fodor.
My diagnosis in this situation is: it is likely that Kim is not aware his account of multiple
realization is different from that of Fodor’s (1974). And since Kim has endorsed the
received truism of (K2), as developed in the multiple realization literature, he would not
think that what divides him and Fodor is (K2). Hence, in Kim’s (1992), (K2) is
presumed, instead of being argued for and emphasized.26
Why Disjunctive Properties are not Natural?
Although missing the point, I shall discuss Kim’s reasoning in supporting (K3), the
claim that a disjunctive property with significantly different disjuncts is not natural.
There are two reasons for doing so. First, Kim’s reasoning is relevant to the
development of the causal power subset account of multiple realization, the latter would
be discussed in the next chapter. Second, I think that Kim’s reasons in support of (K3)
involve some complications that are worth clarifying.
In Kim’s (1992), we can identify three reasons Kim has raised in justifying the nonnaturalness of disjunctive property. They are projectability, similarities and differences,
and similarities and differences in causal powers. The first criterion comes from a

Here I shall note that Fodor’s (1997) reply to Kim’s (1992) also fails to recognize the crux of their
disagreement.
26
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familiar reading of Kim’s (1992). The latter two are somewhat underappreciated.
Though, it is the latter two reasons that are more relevant to the next chapter.
First Reason: Projectability
First, we have projectability. Kim argues as follow: a disjunction of two or more
heterogeneous properties is not natural, because the law that the disjunctive property
figures in, is not projectable, and a law that is not projectable, is not a genuine law (Kim
1992, 11-13; see, for example, Block 1997, 119; Antony 2003, for this reading). A law
is not projectable if positive instances of the law do not confirm the law. Consider Kim’s
example: “All jade is green”. It is not a genuine law, as it is not projectible. Having a
green jade does not confirm the “law” “All jade is green”. But why? We are told that
the property being jade is a disjunctive property formed by two heterogeneous mineral
properties: being jadeite and being nephrite. The “law” “all Jade is green”, in fact, is
the two separate laws, “all Jadeite is green” and “all Nephrite is green”, being put
together arbitrarily. The result, therefore, is that “all Jade is green” is identical to “all
Jadeite or Nephrite is green”. Suppose we have an instance of green Jadeite, it does not
support the “law” that “all Jadeite or Nephrite is green”, 27 as no matter how many
samples of green Jadeite we have, it could not confirm the “all Nephrite is green” part
that is being built in “all Jadeite or Nephrite is green”.
Hence, if we have reason to think that a law is unprojectable, we may thereby infer that
the involved property is not natural. One may question how deep this reason cuts, as
unprojectability is an epistemological feature of a law. Naturalness, on the other hand,
is a worldly feature of properties and kinds. There is a sense in which the problem of
unprojectability is an epistemological consequence of making generalizations over
problematic kinds. Why is it the case that positive instances of “all jade is green” do not
confirm the law? Because the law picked out two heterogeneous properties, Jadeite and
Nephrite. Unprojectability is an epistemological consequence when we are making
generalizations over two different properties.

This is how the unprojectability story is usually put. Though, it is worth mentioning that there is a sense
in which samples of green Jadeite in fact confirm the law that “all Jadeite or Nephrite is green.” For one
may think that samples of green Jadeite at least confirm the Jadeite part of the law. I shall leave this
complication aside. Credit is given to Dan Marshall for this suggestion.
27
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I contend that this is the reason why Kim has included two more reasons in explaining
the non-naturalness of disjunctive property, both relying on the notion of similarity, to
which I now turn.
Second Reason: Makes for Similarity
Kim provides two more reasons in support of the non-naturalness of disjunctive
properties. The first one is a “similarity” account that was mentioned en passant when
he discusses the case of Jade. When explaining how a property is projectable, Kim
considers the “simple maxim” that “similar things behave in similar ways”, and
similarity “is the core of our idea of property”, and with a “for more, see” footnote citing
Willard V. Quine (on natural kind), David Lewis, and D. M. Armstrong (on universals)
(Kim 1992, 13). This is to say, a natural property is natural because it makes for
similarity, and that a disjunctive property fails to be natural because it does not make
for similarity. It is because P and Q are different properties, and that the disjoined
disjunctive property P or Q cannot make for similarity that a law involving the
disjunctive property <P or Q> is not projectable.
Although appears to be simple, this “makes for similarity” account of naturalness
involves the following complication: not any similarity count for naturalness, and not
any differences count against naturalness. This is captured by (K3): we need “significant”
differences (among the disjuncts) to make a disjunctive property non-natural. As Kim
puts:
There is nothing wrong with disjunctive predicate as such; the trouble arises when
the kinds denoted by the disjoined predicates are heterogeneous, “wildly
disjunctive”, so that instances falling under them do not show the kind of
“similarity”, or unity, that we expect of instances falling under a single kind.
(Kim 1992, 13)
Consider the property being an African emerald and the property being a non-African
emerald. They are different properties, but the disjunctive property, being an African
emerald or being a non-African emerald, seems to be a natural property. Kim remarks,
“similarity of the required sorts” hold for African emeralds and non-African emeralds
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(Kim 1992, 13), for, both African emeralds and non-African emeralds are, well,
emeralds. Not every difference counts for non-naturalness.
Consider the property being Nephrite and the property being Jadeite. With only
“superficial” similarities, e.g. they share the same color, texture, Kim thinks that Jadeite
and Nephrite “do not exhibit an appropriate ‘similarity’ with respect to each other” (Kim
1992, 13). Not every similarity count for naturalness.
Hence, we have (K3), where it is required that the differences between the disjuncts are
significant to make the disjunctive property non-natural. But where to draw the line
between significant similarity and insignificant similarity, and significant difference and
insignificant difference? Can differences and similarities be numerically counted, so
that significance and insignificance are linked to the “size and amount” of the
differences and similarities?28 I do not think that Kim has given us a clear elaboration
on these important questions, but only some hints.29
Two points to note.
First, without a clear account of how similar, or how significantly similar two properties
need to be, for them to be natural, we are not able to tell if Kim’s account of naturalness
is fully satisfactory.
Second, the aforementioned complication of Kim’s similarity account of naturalness is
not well appreciated in the subsequent reply to Kim’s (1992). As we have seen,

It is worth mentioning that there are two ways through which one can answer the question “how similar
are these two things/properties?” The first way is to treat similarities as being capable of counting, such
that two things can have a number of features in common. Under this way of understanding, two things
are maximally similar with each other if they have maximal features in common. Two blue and 5kg cubes
will be more similar to each other, than with a blue and 4kg cube, as the former pair share more common
features with each other than that of the latter. The second way to answer the question is to compare how
natural/fundamental the similarity between two things is, with respect to just one aspect. This seems to
be the idea employed by David Lewis with his notion of perfect naturalness (1983). Under this way of
understanding, two electrons will be more similar than two cars, even though, presumably, two cars may
have more features in common than two electrons. This is because being an electron is a more
fundamental and natural property than being a car.
28

One page later where the example of emerald is discussed, Kim states that chemical property is
prioritized and emphasized in such context because chemical properties are explanatory rich and powerful
(Kim 1992, 14).
29
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according to (K3), for a disjunctive property to be non-natural, the disjuncts have to be
significantly different from the others. Later formulation of Kim’s argument, for
example, Clapp’s (2001), has failed to appreciate this point. (K3) is reformulated as the
thesis that, for a disjunctive property to be non-natural, the disjuncts have to be different,
simpliciter. It is under this context that the causal power subset strategy is developed,
to which I shall return in the next chapter.
Third Reason: Makes for Causal Similarity
The third reason Kim offers in support of the non-naturalness of disjunctive properties
concerns causal power, which, in turn, is closely related to the aforementioned simple
similarity maxim. Kim provides the following principle:
[Principle of Causal Individuation of Kinds] Kinds in science are individuated
on the basis of causal powers; that is, objects and events fall under a kind, or
share in a property, insofar as they have similar causal powers. (Kim 1992, 17)
Kim takes this principle to be plausible and widely accepted. I shall not get into the
complication involving the metaphysics of causation and causal powers for the moment.
What is sufficient for our discussion is that property and causal powers are considered
closely related. A property bestows its owner a set of causal powers. For example, a
stone has the power to break the window in virtue of having the property being massive.
Kim reasons as follow: since, according to (K1), the Ps are different, the causal powers
that the Ps bestow their owner are also different: “they are diverse as causal powers and
enter into diverse causal laws” (Kim 1992, 17). If this is so, we arrive at a reason very
similar to that of the “simple maxim” in supporting the claim that a disjunctive property
is not natural: that the disjuncts belong to different “causal kinds” (since they bestow
their owner different causal powers) “and are disqualified as proper scientific kind”
(Kim 1992, 18).
In fact, one can see this third reason as an elaboration on the second. The claim that two
things are similar because they have similar causal powers can be regarded as an
elaboration of the claim that two properties are similar, per se. Though, we will see in
the next chapter that the introduction of causal powers fuels the development of the
causal power subset view of multiple realization.
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Concluding Remarks
Fodor’s account of multiple realization is not physicalist enough, physical realization
is underdeveloped. Kim’s account of multiple realization fixes the bug, but as a result,
he has weakened Anti-Reductionism and, most importantly, renders S non-natural,
undermining naturalness. Naturalness, however, is one of the central motivations of
multiple realization, as multiple realization theorists would like their cherished special
scientific properties to be legitimate, playing an autonomous role in the laws of the
special sciences. Is there a solution to Kim’s challenge?
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Chapter 5 Multiple Realization in the Causal Power Subset View
Background
In the previous two chapters, I have looked at Fodor’s account of multiple realization
and Kim’s account of multiple realization through the lens of the four desiderata of
multiple realization. We discover that both Fodor’s and Kim’s accounts are
unsatisfactory (though Kim intended his account to be unsatisfactory). Fodor’s account
of multiple realization fails to make sense of Physical Realization, while Kim’s account
fails to make sense of naturalness.
The multiple realization literature sees Kim’s (1992) as a great threat to multiple
realization. The reason is that multiple realization theorists usually think that multiply
realized properties are everywhere. Many special scientific properties are taken to be
multiply realized. But if Kim is correct, all of these properties are not natural. As Lenny
Clapp noted, if Kim is correct, “all, or almost all, properties are illegitimate [(nonnatural)]” (2001, 123). Multiple realization theorists need to find a way to avoid Kim’s
disaster.
Around the 2000s, some philosophers, including Louisa Anthony (2003), Lenny Clapp
(2001), Sydney Shoemaker (2009), and Jessica Wilson (2011), have developed broadly
similar views in handling Kim’s challenge. Jessica Wilson summarizes and calls them
the “Power-Based Subset Strategy” (2011), and I will call them the “causal power subset”
view.
The story of the causal power subset view is complicated. The complication comes from
the fact that the view was mobilized to do at least three different things at once. First,
following the story I am telling, it is an attempt to provide a satisfactory account of
multiple realization that resolves Kim’s (1992) non-naturalness challenge. This line of
view is developed in Anthony’s (2003) and Clapp’s (2001).
Second, Wilson takes the causal power subset view of realization to be a solution to
another famous problem faced by Non-Reductive Physicalism, namely, the Causal
Exclusion problem. Somewhat confusingly, the causal exclusion problem is also most
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notably raised by Kim. Kim himself, for example, when discussing the prospect of the
causal power subset view, follows this line (Kim 2010). Paul Audi, as a critic of the
causal power subset view, also treats it as a solution to the exclusion problem (Audi
2011).
Third, proponents of the view see it as a promising formulation of “Non-Reductive
Physicalism” (Clapp 2001), or “Non-Reductive Realization” (Wilson 2011). Wilson, for
example, takes the causal power subset account of realization to be the best account of
Non-Reductive Physicalism.
It is important not to confuse these three lines of reasoning. What I am interested in is
the first and the third agenda. I am interested in, first, whether the causal power subset
view, taken as an account of multiple realization, can redeem Naturalness. And second,
whether it can make sense of Non-Reductive Physicalism, the position aimed at
upholding both Anti-Reductionism and Physical Realization. I have no interest in
dealing with the problem of causal exclusion.30
The Causal Power Subset Account of Multiple Realization
Now I turn to the account of multiple realization under the causal power subset view.
That the causal power subset view is an account of realization is explicit in Shoemaker’s
Here I shall include a brief explication of the causal exclusion problem and explain how it is different
from the non-naturalness problem. In brief, the exclusion problem arises because the following seemingly
plausible claims are incompatible: (1) Mental states cause things to happen. (2) Mental states are different
from physical states. (3) Any caused event has a complete and non-redundant physical cause.
30

The literature on causal exclusion is huge, the formulation of the problem I have given is not the most
precise one. What I want to highlight here is that it is not directly a problem for multiple realization. Even
if a mental state is singly realized, such that there is only one way for something to be in that mental state,
the causal exclusion problem remains. We still got the question of whether the mental state has any causal
role to play vis-à-vis its physical realizers. For a more precise statement of the problem, see chapter 2 of
Kim’s (2005).
However, Kim’s (1992) contains an element that may introduce confusion. Recall, Kim has provided
several reasons in support of the claim that a disjunctive property is not natural. One reason Kim thinks
why a disjunctive property is not natural is that the disjuncts are different, where similarity is a benchmark
for naturalness. Based on this reason, Kim introduces a derivative reason that involves the notion of
“causal power”. Causal power is introduced when Kim thinks that scientific properties are individuated
by causal powers. Understanding property in this way enables Kim to state a further reason to explain
why <P1 v P2> is not natural, namely, that the causal powers associated with P 1 are different from that of
P2. As such, Kim’s introduction of causal power in his (1992) has nothing to do with the causal exclusion
problem. Baker’s (2009) for example, fails to appreciate this point. He discusses Kim’s (1992) under the
context of causal exclusion, and therefore has misinterpreted the bearing of Kim’s (1992).
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(2009) and Wilson’s (2011). Anthony’s (2003) and Clapp’s (2001) do not explicitly take
the causal power subset view as an account of multiple realization. Though, their ideas
and arguments can be regarded as an implicit implementation of the view (as noted by
Wilson as well, 2011, 149). I will introduce the causal power subset account of multiple
realization by slightly modifying Wilson’s formulation, without going into the subtle
differences of the various views.
Here is a reconstruction of the causal power subset account of multiple realization,
followed by an elaboration. Suppose S is a special scientific property and P1, P2, … Pn
are physical properties, such that S is multiply realized by the Ps:
(CPS1) Both S and the Ps are each associated with a non-empty and unique set of
causal powers of which the property bestows the object if the object instantiates
the property.
(CPS2) The set of causal powers associated with S is a non-empty proper subset
of the set of causal powers associated with P1, with P2 … and with Pn. More
specifically, the set of causal powers associated with S is the intersection set of the
sets of causal powers associated with P1, P2…, and Pn.
(CPS3) The set of causal powers associated with each Pn is different from the set
of causal powers associated with any other Pn. No set of causal powers associated
with any Pn is a subset of the causal powers associated with any other Pn.
(CPS4) Necessarily, whenever an object o instantiates any one of the Ps, o
instantiates property S.
(CPS5) Whenever an object o instantiates a property Pn and thereby property S,
each causal power bestowed to o by S is token identical to a causal power bestowed
to o by P.
Each claim needs elaboration.
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The reason why the causal power subset view is named as such can be explained by
(CPS1). Proponents of the view hold a particular view concerning properties: that a
property bestows its possessor causal powers. As I have mentioned, Kim has already
brought the idea of causal power into the scene in his (1992). To explicate the claim,
consider the property being 5 kg. Causal power theorists would claim that an object
having the property is bestowed with some causal powers in virtue of being 5 kg. For
example, an object o having being 5 kg may thereby have the power to break x when o
is smashed with x, and the power to cause fatigue if I am to carry o, so on and on.
There are huge controversies over what causal powers actually are, and how causal
powers are related to property. On the latter question, there is one extreme view called
Dispositionalism, according to which all properties are essentially dispositional (Choi
and Fara 2018), a property just is a bundle of causal powers. When we say that the
object has the property being 5 kg, we in fact ascribe to the object a bundle of causal
powers that a thing can do by being 5 kg. Some causal power subset theorists endorse
this view (Clapp 2001, Shoemaker 2009). In contrast with Dispositionalism we have
Categoricalism, the view according to which the causal powers are contingently
associated with a property. The nature of a property is given by how the property is,31
instead of given by what the object is disposed to do in possible circumstances (Choi
and Fara 2018).
Wilson is aware of the controversies over causal powers. She thinks that the causal
power subset account is neutral regarding these controversies (2011, 126-127). For the
account to work, it requires only that a property can be taken as being associated with
a set of causal powers, essential or not. I have formulated (CPS1) in such a neutral way.
The distinction will become crucial when the two desiderata, Anti-Reductionism and
Physical Realization, are discussed.
To sum up, (CPS1) is the background claim that both the realized and the realizing
property is associated with a set of causal powers.

Those who find the very notion of “nature of property” problematic and mysterious may drop the notion,
and consider Categoricalism simply as the view that property can have different causal powers in different
possible worlds.
31
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(CPS2) is the subset claim. It states that the set of causal powers associated with the
realized property is a non-empty proper subset of the set of causal power associated
with the realized properties. For example, if S is multiply realized by P1 and P2, and P1
is associated with the set of causal power c1, c2, and P2 is associated with the set of
causal power c1, c3, S is associated with the intersection-set of the causal powers c1. The
set of causal powers of S is a proper subset of P1, and also P2, so on for all realizers.
The first part of (CPS3) is the Multiplicity claim. But note that instead of the simple
claim that each realizer is different, simpliciter, together with (CPS2), it implies that
each P is partially different and partially similar by sharing some, but not all causal
powers from another P. We can say that S picks out the common causal powers among
the otherwise different Ps. (CPS3) is crucial as an attempt to fix Kim’s (1992) bug.
The second part of (CPS3) is the claim that the Ps do not realize each other, in the
fashion of (CPS2). No realizer is associated with a set of causal powers that is a subset
of that of the other realizers.
(CPS4) is the usual claim that the realizing property P necessitates the realized property
S. This is to capture the metaphysical dependency relationship between S and the Ps,
that the realizing property Ps necessitates the realized property S.
(CPS5) is a further specification on what is happening when an object is having the
realized and realizing properties. This “token identity” claim is explicitly endorsed by
Wilson (2011, 128). The claim is that when an object possesses a realizing property, say,
P1, and thereby possesses the realized property, say, S, the causal power bestowed to the
object by S, say, c1, is token identical to the causal power c1 bestowed to the object by
P1. I believe that this rather occult “token identical” claim can only be made sense of if
we take causal powers to be particular features that an object has when having the
property. This is because only particular things could be considered as “tokens” and
counted as such.32 Since (CPS5) can only be made sense of if causal powers are taken

Causal powers, thus understood, is comparable to the idea of “tropes” in trope theory, a theory of
property according to which properties are particularized features that an object has. But whether causal
powers just are tropes depends on whether one endorse the view that properties just are bundle of causal
powers, and whether one endorse the trope theory of property.
32
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as particular features of objects, I think Wilson is incorrect when she says that the causal
power subset view is neutral on issues concerning the nature of causal powers.
I contend that the causal power subset account of multiple realization is rather occult
when comparing with Fodor’s or Kim’s account. It is better to illustrate the account
with an example before moving to the evaluation section.
An Example of the Causal Power Subset Account of Multiple Realization
Let S be the special scientific property being in pain; Let P1 be being in brain state X,
and P2 be being in silicon state D. Suppose we have a case of multiple realization, such
that being in pain is multiply realized by being in brain state X and being in silicon state
D.
According to (CPS1), properties are associated with a set of causal powers. Say, being
in pain is associated with the power to induce a painful feeling. Being in brain state X
is associated with two causal powers: the power to induce a painful feeling; and the
power to trigger neural sensors. Being in silicon state D is characterized by two causal
powers: the power to induce a painful feeling; and the power to trigger silicon sensors.
According to (CPS2), the set of causal powers associated with being in pain is a nonempty proper subset of the set of causal powers associated with being in brain state X,
and of the set of causal powers associated with being in silicon state. {The power to
induce a painful feeling} is a non-empty proper subset of {the power to induce a painful
feeling, the power to trigger neural sensors}, and of {the power to induce a painful
feeling, the power to trigger silicon sensors}. More specifically, the set of causal power
associated with being in pain is the intersection of the sets of causal powers of being in
brain state X and being in silicon state D. Put it simpler, being in pain pick out the
common causal powers among the two realizing properties.
According to (CPS3), being in brain state X and being in silicon state D share some
causal powers and differ in some causal powers. Being in brain state X is similar to
being in silicon state D with respect to the power to induce a painful feeling. And they
differ with respect to other causal powers. Further, the set of causal powers associated
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with being in brain state X and being in silicon state D is not a subset of the other, they
do not realize one another.
According to (CPS4), necessarily, whenever an object instantiates any one of the
properties being in brain state X, or, being in silicon state D, the object thereby
instantiates being in pain as well.
Moving in to (CPS5). Suppose in one morning Mark has the property being in pain.
Mark’s being in pain is realized by being in brain state X. Mark also has the property
being in brain state X. By being in brain state X, Mark has the causal power to induce
a painful feeling (unto himself; let’s forgive the linguistic strangeness). By being in
brain state X, Mark has the causal power to induce a painful feeling, and the power to
trigger neural sensors. According to (CPS5), the power to induce a painful feeling
bestowed by being in brain state X is numerically identical to the power to induce a
painful feeling bestowed by being in pain. Mark has one token of the power to induce
a painful feeling, not two.
The Four Desiderata: Multiplicity and Naturalness
How successful is the causal power subset account of multiple realization in making
sense of the four desiderata? I will first consider Multiplicity and Naturalness in this
section, recall:
Multiplicity. There are at least two realizers P for any multiply realized property S.
That the realizing properties Ps are different from each other.
Naturalness. That the realized property S is a natural property.
Multiplicity is arguably satisfied, albeit in a novel fashion. According to (CPS3), P1 and
P2 are different by having different sets of causal powers. The causal power subset
account modified the simple claim that P1 and P2 are different simpliciter, as per (F1).
Proponents of the view deem that P1 and P2 are different in some respects, but are
similar in other respects. This trick is enabled by (CPS1), the causal power view of
properties. By associating properties with sets of causal powers, the view introduces
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complexity into properties. Properties, with a set of causal powers, could now be
considered a complex thing with constituents (the causal powers). And as a complex
thing, two properties could now be considered partially similar, with respect to some
causal powers that they do share, and partially different, with respect to other causal
powers that they do not share. This enables P1 and P2 to be partially different, satisfying
Multiplicity, while giving space for partial similarity as an attempt to avoid Kim’s nonnaturalness charge, to which I now turn.
Naturalness is arguably satisfied. Though, it involves a complicated story. Recall Kim’s
view: since S is identical to the disjunction of the significantly different Ps, and since a
disjunctive property with significantly disjuncts is not natural, S is not natural. What is
the response from the causal power subset theorists?
The first question to ask: under the causal power subset view, is S identical to the
disjunction of the Ps? In my formulation of the causal power subset view, I have left the
relation between S and the disjunction of the P unmentioned. One complication is that
both Clapp and Anthony reject the very idea of a disjunctive property, while Wilson
seems to be neutral as to whether there is any disjunctive property. For Clapp, Kim’s
question of non-naturalness is not whether a disjunctive property is natural, instead, the
question becomes: on what condition does a disjunctive predicate pick out a property?
But note that there is a one-to-one translation from Clapp’s formulation to ours.
Whenever one says that a disjunctive predicate does not pick out a property, we say that
the disjunctive property is not natural. So far in this thesis, I have assumed an abundant
theory of property, according to which there are disjunctive properties, hence, I shall set
aside this complication and continue to assume that there exists disjunctive property.
Can a causal power subset strategist identify S and the disjunction of the Ps, and claim
that S is natural? It is tempting to think that they can identify S and the disjunction of
the Ps while making S natural, as this seems to be the sole point of the causal power
subset strategy. That is, the causal power subset strategy seems to be arguing that
disjunctive properties can be natural, contrary to Kim. However, I shall show that the
disjunctive property under the causal power subset view is still non-natural. Hence, the
causal power subset view must deny that S is identical to the disjunction of the Ps, if
the naturalness of S is to be saved.
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To appreciate this complication, consider first why it is tempting to think that the causal
power subset view is advancing the claim that the disjunctive property is natural. The
trick is to grant partial similarities among the disjuncts, i.e. the Ps. By sharing some
causal powers and differing in some causal powers, the disjuncts are partially similar
and partially different, hence, the disjuncts are not completely different. The reasoning
seems to be that as long as the sets of causal powers associated with the Ps overlap, the
disjunction of the Ps can make for (partial) similarity.33
Since making for similarity is a benchmark of naturalness (recall Kim’s simple maxim
that “similar things behave in similar ways”), we now seem to have a reason in thinking
that the disjunctive property is natural: for, the disjuncts are partially similar, and hence
the disjunctive property seems to be able to make for similarity, albeit partially.
The seeming that the disjunctive property with partially similar disjuncts can make for
naturalness is tempting, but illusory. To see why this is the case, consider another
benchmark for naturalness: projectability. Can a law that involves a disjunctive property
(with partially similar disjuncts) be confirmed by positive instances of the law? No.34
Consider the following example.
This is the straightforward reading of Clapp and Anthony’s reasoning. Both philosophers looked at
David Armstrong’s (1978) argument against the existence of disjunctive property (in our formulation, the
naturalness of disjunctive property). Both philosophers cited the following passage from Armstrong:
33

[…] disjunctive properties offended against the principle that a genuine property is identical in its
different particulars. Suppose a has a property P but lacks Q, while b has Q but lacks P. It seems
laughable to conclude from these premises that a and b are identical in some respects. Yet both
have the ‘‘property’’, P or Q.
(Armstrong 1978, 20).
Clapp’s and Anthony’s reply is that Armstrong’s reasoning works only if P and Q are completely different
properties. But if P and Q are partially different and partially similar properties, the two things indeed are
“identical in some respects” by having the two properties. In explicating this “partial similar” story, both
Clapp and Anthony accepts (CPS1), the causal power theory of property. Properties are complex, as they
are associated with a set of causal powers. Two properties can share some causal powers but differ in
other causal powers.
In fact, both Clapp’s and Anthony’s views are a bit more complicated than this. For example, in Clapp’s
(2001) view, a disjunctive predicate has to satisfy two conditions to pick out a property. In our wordings,
a disjunctive property has to satisfy two conditions to be natural. The first condition is that the disjuncts
overlap on at least one causal power, i.e. the intersection set of the causal powers associated with the
disjuncts is not the empty set. The second condition is that if a property is associated with the intersection
set of the causal power just mentioned, the property is one of the disjuncts of the disjunctive property
(2001, 197). So far I have just been emphasizing the first condition, and have left the second unmentioned,
since the second condition is not important to the dialectics of the situation.
34

Credit is given to Dan Marshall for bringing this point to me.
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LAW: All (Red and Cubical) or (Red and Spherical) things are tables
Being Red and Cubical and Being Red and Spherical in this example is the Ps in the
causal power subset view. Set aside the idea of causal power,35 these two conjunctive
properties are partially similar, for, they share some, but not all of the conjuncts. The
point is that the disjunctive property Being Red and Cubical OR Being Red and
Spherical is not natural, because positive instances of LAW do not confirm LAW. Being
Red and Cubical OR Being Red and Spherical is not projectable, hence, not natural.
Suppose we have picked up a red cubical table. It is a positive instance of LAW. But
does this give us reason to believe that the next red and spherical thing is a table?
Presumably not. Like that of the example of jade, it tells us nothing about the Red and
Spherical part of LAW. Being Red and Cubical and Being Red and Spherical fails at the
projectability test. The disjunction, therefore, is not natural. The same reasoning applies
to the Ps. The disjunction of the Ps would fail at the projectability test, and hence the
disjunction of the Ps is not natural, even though the Ps are partially similar.
The picture now arrived at is this: the disjuncts share some causal powers. But we have
just shown that partial similarities among the disjuncts do not make the disjunctive
property natural. We cannot identify S with the disjunction. We need another story
explaining the naturalness of S, as required by Naturalness.
To respect Naturalness, S has to be different from the disjunction of the Ps. In fact, this
is the view held by Wilson (though for different reasons). (CPS2) makes it the case that
S is associated with the common causal powers among the disjuncts. Hence, S picks out
the partial commonality among the Ps. This partial commonality is non-disjunctive, and
hence, there is no problem for it to take part in a genuine law, and hence, to be natural.
An important consequence is that the causal power subset view of multiple realization
is similar to that of Fodor in this respect. Both views deny that S is identical to the
disjunction of the realizing Ps. An implication, as mentioned, is that they have to

I will argue in a later section that the very idea of causal power is not essential to the causal power
subset view of multiple realization.
35
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endorse the claim that there are non-identical but necessarily co-extensive properties.
One problem for Fodor’s view of multiple realization is that Physical Realization is not
being respected. The relation between the realized S and the realized Ps is not well
specified, so as to render the relation a physically acceptable one. Does the causal power
subset view face the same problem? One way to see the causal power subset view of
multiple realization is that it is an improvement over Fodor’s account of multiple
realization, as it provides a more detailed elaboration on how S and the Ps are related,
by introducing the story of the subset relation of causal power. Fodor is silent on the
relation between S and the Ps. The causal power subset account at least says something
about it. Whether the relationship satisfies Anti-Reductionism and Physical Realization
is something I am to consider in the next section.
One final complication to note before moving away from the problem of Naturalness:
Kim’s argument is not relying on the claim that a disjunctive property is not natural
because its disjuncts are different, simpliciter. As emphasized in the previous chapter,
Kim’s argument requires that the disjuncts be significantly different, even though we
don’t see a clear account of significance from Kim. Both Anthony and Clapp seem to
have overlooked this subtle detail in Kim’s (1992). They think that Kim is advancing
the claim that the non-naturalness of a disjunctive property is a result of its disjuncts
being different, simpliciter. As a response, they reply that the disjuncts share at least
some causal powers.
Consider jade again. A Jadeite stone and a Nephrite stone, in fact, share some causal
powers, despite their sharing of different chemical causal powers. I don’t think Kim
would deny that, for example, both kinds of stones have the causal power to induce a
greenish perceptual experience unto human beings in normal lighting conditions. Under
the construal of causal power subset view of realization, since Jadeite and Nephrite
share some causal powers, they could make for similarity and hence, for naturalness.
Kim’s point, however, is that those similarities are not significant enough to count for
naturalness.
The following questions still haunt us: how many causal powers are required to make
for naturalness? And how significant do those causal powers need to be, to make for
naturalness? I think there is no clear answer on this issue, both from the causal power
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subset theorists and from Kim’s (1992), since the causal power subset literature seems
to

have

entirely

overlooked

the

problem

of

significant/insignificant

similarities/differences.
These are difficult questions, relating to broader philosophical problems concerning
what naturalness and similarity are. Here is not the place to explore the problem any
further. What can be said, however, is that the causal power subset account of realization
has offered an interesting proposal to the problem of non-naturalness in multiple
realization: that the realizers are partially different and partially similar. By this, a proper
part of the realizers can make for similarities.
I contend that the rough idea of “same but different” that defines multiple realization is
captured in this picture. We see “sameness” among the realizers when we are focusing
on those partial similarities, and we see “differences” when we are focusing on those
partial differences. I shall elaborate on the view when I sketch my preferred account of
multiple realization in the next chapter.
The Four Desiderata: Physical Realization and Anti-Reductionism
Now I turn to the “Non-Reductive Physicalist dual”: Physical Realization and AntiReductionism. Recall:
Physical Realization. That S is physically realized by, and hence nothing over and
above the Ps.
Anti-Reductionism. That S is not reducible to the Ps.
Does the causal power subset account provide a promising account of how S is
“physically nothing over and above”, and yet “not-reducible to” the Ps? Wilson is
optimistic about such a project. She thinks that the causal power subset view of
realization is the best view in making sense of Non-Reductive Physicalism, which, as
introduced in chapter 2, is a position captured by our two desiderata, Physical
Realization, and Anti-Reductionism. I shall argue, contrary to Wilson’s optimism, that
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the causal power subset account of multiple realization faces serious problems when
making sense of Physical Realization and Anti-Reductionism.
Physical Realization is mostly being respected by (CPS2), where the causal power
associated with the realized property is considered a proper subset of that of the
realizing physical property. This “being part of” or “being a proper subset of” relation
elaborates the “nothing over and above” claim. The realized property is nothing over
and above the physical realizing property because the realized property contributes no
novel causal power to the object.
Physical Realization is further being respected by (CPS5), according to which the causal
powers of the realized property are token identical to the realizing property. Not only
does the realized property bestows no new causal power type to the object on top of that
of the realizing property, but the realized property also bestows no new causal power
token as well. This is a further elaboration on how the realized property is “nothing over
and above” the realizing property.
Anti-Reductionism, on the other side, is alleged to be respected also by the subset claim
of causal power. It is argued that since a proper subset is not identical to its proper
superset, the realized property is not identical to, and hence, not reducible to, its physical
realizer.
But is this view plausible? To sharpen our discussion, let Physical Realization be the
claim that the non-physical realized property is “nothing over and above” the physical
realizing property; And let Anti-Reductionism be the claim that the non-physical
realized property is “not reducible to” the physical realizing property. I shall argue that
the causal power subset account of realization fails to make sense of these two claims
at the same time.
Recall (CPS1). Causal power subset theorists hold that a property is associated with a
set of causal powers that the property would contribute to the object if the object is to
possess the property. As mentioned, there are two types of theory accounting for the
relation between causal powers and property: Dispositionalism and Categoricalism. I
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shall argue that both versions of the causal power subset account of multiple realization
fail to make sense of Physical Realization and Anti-Reductionism.
Consider first Dispositionalism, the view according to which a property just is a bundle
of causal powers. Under this view, both the realized S and the realizing P are identified
with a bundle of causal powers. Suppose P is identified with causal power c1 and c2, and
S is identified with causal power c1.
For now, we have a question: in virtue of what P is a physical property and that S is a
realized but non-physical property? An answer is that P is a physical property because
c1 and c2 are physical causal powers. (And I don’t see there is any other way the question
can be answered, since, according to Dispositionalism, a property just is a bundle of
causal powers).
Suppose c1 and c2 are physical causal powers, then how can we account for the nonphysicality of property S, that is, c1? Since c1 is itself a physical causal power, and S is
nothing but c1, I see no way one could insist that S is a non-physical (but realized)
property. If S is itself a physical property, then Physical Realization and AntiReductionism cannot be made sense of, since both claims require that there be a nonphysical realized property having a certain relation to the physical realizing property.
There seems to be no problem for reductionists after all, for we have nothing nonphysical in need of reduction at all! As Kim put it, this is just a version of reductive
physicalism (Kim 2010, 280).
One may then retreat to the claim that c1 is a non-physical causal power and c2 is a
physical causal power, such that the “physical” P is identified with c1 and c2 and the
non-physical P is identified with c2. This move is equally problematic. For it is no longer
clear why P is a physical property after all. How could we make sense of a physical
property if it is identified with a non-physical part and a physical part? I see no
satisfactory answer can be given. If P is not a physical property, then, again, Physical
Realization and Anti-Reductionism cannot be made sense of. Since both claims require
there to be a physical realizer having a certain relation to the non-physical realized
property.
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To conclude the problem for the Dispositionalist version of the causal power subset
account of realization: either one endorses the claim that the causal powers at issue are
entirely physical, or the claim that some causal powers are non-physical. Endorsing the
former leads to the problem that the realized property is, after all, physical, while
endorsing the latter leads to the problem that the realizing property is not physical at all.
Since Physical Realization and Anti-Reductionism require both a non-physical realized
property and a physical realizing property at the same time, the Dispositionalist version
of the causal power subset view fails to respect Physical Realization and AntiReductionism.
Now I turn to Categoricalism, the view according to which a property is distinct from
the contingently associated causal powers. According to the Categoricalist version of
the causal power subset account of realization, both the realized S and the realizing P
are contingently associated with a (non-empty) set of causal powers, where the realized
property is a proper subset of that of the realizing. For example, property P is
contingently associated with causal powers c1 and c2, and property S is contingently
associated with the causal power c1.
Categoricalism can avoid the difficult question faced by Dispositionalism, i.e. why is P
a physical property and S a non-physical property? Categoricalists have a different
answer: because P is itself physical and S is itself non-physical. To see how it could be
done, suppose that all of the causal powers at issue are physical. Although the causal
powers associated with S, c1, is a physical causal power, S is not exhausted by it, for S
is not identical to c1, and one can stipulate that S itself is non-physical.
My major concern over the Categoricalist version of the causal power subset account
of realization is that S is idle. Suppose an object has causal power c1, c2 by having
property P. In what sense do we have an extra property S, contributing the very same
causal power c1 to that object? Apart from that, S contributes no other causal power to
the object. What S is up to is just that it is sitting quietly and sharing the causal power
with P.
Paul Audi has mobilized an exclusion-style argument to argue against the causal power
subset view. Briefly, he suggests: S seems to be excluded from metaphysically
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explaining why the object has c1, for, P is already a sufficient metaphysical explanation
of c1 (Audi, 2011). I share most of Audi’s concerns, though I think that S strikes me as
idle without introducing any issues concerning metaphysical explanation. The positing
of a quiet property S sharing the very same copy of causal powers with P appears to me
to be an ad hoc response to save Non-Reductive Physicalism, which results in a very
strange view. S is metaphysically idle and can be eliminated.36
It should be emphasized that this is not a concern over Categoricalism per se. For, one
criticism over Categoricalism is that the property itself seems to be “in the dark” in the
sense that we have no way to gain access to it, apart from how the property is causally
affecting us as an observer. We can only see and touch the causal powers, so to speak.
The worry I have with the realized S in the Categoricalist version is that S is doubly “in
the dark”. Not only do we have a problem accessing property per se, but we also have
an extra problem of making sense of how there is an extra property S sharing the same
causal powers with another property P, and does nothing else, even if we grant P
unproblematic. I do not think that there is any reason to posit such an idle entity.37
If we deem S an idle posit, we eliminate it, for the sake of the much-praised virtue of
theoretical simplicity. If S is eliminated, the resultant view cannot make sense of both
Physical Realization and Anti-Reductionism, since both claims require that there be a
non-physical realized property.

One may promptly react that this “idleness” objection just is the causal exclusion argument I have set
aside in the beginning of this chapter. I agree that the idleness charge shares the same spirit with the
causal exclusion argument. However, Audi’s exclusion argument and my simpler idleness charge are both
different from the causal exclusion argument. The causal exclusion argument, for example, usually relies
on a principle called “physical closure”, stating that the causal network is closed under the physical realm.
Audi’s exclusion argument and my simpler idleness charge do not rely on such principle concerning
causation.
36

An extra, but to me, less major problem for the Categoricalist version over the Dispositionalist version
is that the Categoricalist has an extra theoretical cost with respect to (CPS4). (CPS4) claim that the
realizing Ps necessitate the realizing S. Under the Dispositionalist version, (CPS4) is not an extra posit
of the theory. Since P is just the bundle of c1 and c2 and S is just c1, you cannot fail to have c1 if you
already have c1 and c2. But under the Categoricalist view, since the property is not identified with the
bundle of property, it is conceptually possible to fail to have S, even if you have P. Having c 1 and c2 do
not guarantee us an S, since S is distinct from P, and S is distinct from the causal powers. If this is the
case, the necessitation relation from the realized P to the realizing S has to be postulated independently
and in a brute way. (CPS4) is an extra posit under the Categoricalist version.
37
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Since both Categoricalist and Dispositionalist cannot make sense of Physical
Realization and Anti-Reductionism satisfactorily, and since Categoricalism and
Dispositionalism exhaust the plausible options, 38 the causal power subset view of
multiple realization fails to make sense of Physical Realization and Anti-Reductionism.
A Nudge Toward Representationalism
Despite of the aforementioned difficulties, I believe that the causal power subset
account of multiple realization is insightful. It nudges us toward a representational
reading of Anti-Reductionism, and as a result, there is a way to reconcile the claim that
the realized property is nothing over and above the physical property, while the realized
property is “not-reducible” to the physical property, if the latter non-reducibility claim
is understood in a representational way.39
If we set aside the fuss over Categoricalism and Dispositionalism and return to the basic
picture of the causal power subset account of multiple realization, we are told that the
set of causal powers of a realized property is a proper subset of that of the realizing
property. It appears to me that we have fallen into the trap of double counting when one
insists that the realized property is something real and non-reducible on top of the
realizing property (the term “double counting” is inspired by John Heil’s (1999), and I
think that he is correct). Suppose again an object has causal powers c1 and c2 by having
P, and we insist that that object has causal power c1 by having an extra property S, it is
very hard not to see it as double counting, counting causal power c1 twice. S is spurious.

One alternative option (credit is given to Rafael De Clercq for this suggestion) is to allow some
properties to be Categorical, while some properties Dispositional. Taking such a stance, one may think
the physical realizing property is dispositional, and that the higher level realized property is categorical.
In such a case, a non-reductive physicalist may insist that the higher level property is real and nonphysical. One objection to such a view is that this form of Categoricalist-Dispositionalist dualism is hard
to make sense of, for, we require a further explanation on why there are two types of properties. Plus, we
need an explanation for why it is the higher level properties that are the categorical ones. Further, I do
not see how this proposal could avoid the idleness charge against the idleness of the realized property.
38

Here I add that Clapp is explicitly sympathetic to a representational reading of Anti-Reductionism
under the causal power subset account of multiple realization. He thinks that the reason why we employ
higher level mental predicate is because of our epistemological limitation, and that Non-Reductive
physicalism should be understood as an epistemological thesis (Clapp 2001, 135-136). Here I shall
emphasize that Clapp’s view (as well as mine) is revisionary. Clapp’s conclusion therefore contrasts
sharply with that of Wilson’s. Non-Reductive Physicalism is usually taken as an ontological position, as
clearly stated in Fodor’s (1974) and explicit also in Wilson’s (2011).
39
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But I think that this “double counting” charge has hit upon something important. What
seems to me to be the correct story to tell, if the basic picture of the causal power subset
account is assumed, is that it is our two ways of counting the powers that create the
seemings that we have two different properties: P and S. What differs is that we have
adopted two different ways to carve out the causal powers: the P way that counts all
causal powers, and the S way that counts only some of the causal powers. This is a
representational interpretation of our seemings that S and P are not identical, for, the
two ways of representation are not identical.
On this revisionary interpretation of the view, the physical realizing base is a complex
physical state that could admit a partial representation. Our seeming commitment to the
existence of the realized property is, in fact, a partial description/representation of that
very same complex physical state.
Physical Realization and Anti-Reductionism can now be formulated in an unambiguous
and compatible way. For the former, we can endorse a strong form of physicalism:
everything is entirely physical. For the latter, it is now understood as a representational
claim that there is a less than perfect way to represent a complex physical state.
In the next chapter, I shall develop a representational account of multiple realization.
Before that, I will argue that the gist of causal power subset account of multiple
realization has nothing to do with causal power after all.
Causal Power Subset Account without Causal Power
Now I want to suggest that, despite its name, we can get rid of all of the “causal power”
talk, while preserving the gist of the causal power subset account of multiple realization.
This is good news to those who find the very notion of “causal power” problematic, and
therefore find the causal power subset account of multiple realization difficult to
swallow.
One of the main considerations motivating the causal power subset account of multiple
realization is to solve the problem of non-naturalness against multiple realization, as
developed in Kim’s (1992). Kim’s argument rests on the idea that the realized property
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is identical to a disjunctive property that is not natural. And the reason is that the
disjuncts (which are the realizing properties) are “widely heterogeneous”. The way
causal power subset theorists handle Kim’s non-naturalness challenge is to resist the
central claim that the realizing properties are “widely heterogeneous”. They do so by
allowing the physical realizing properties to be partially similar in virtue of sharing
some of the causal powers.
Note that the crucial claim here is that the realizing properties are not that different,
because they are partially similar and partially different. To establish this very claim,
we can do so without adopting the “causal power” story at all. The only thing needed is
to allow properties to be complex in respect to some features, and hence two properties
can be partially similar in virtue of sharing some of those overlapping features, and be
partially different by having some of those non-overlapping features. The features can
be anything but causal powers.
Here is one possibility. In chapter 2, I said that the multiple realization literature is not
mindfully distinguishing “natural property” from “natural kind”, which assumes a
rather different philosophical tradition and literature on their own. The distinction is
helpful here. At least according to some, the two notions come apart. What is relevant
here is that on one of the accounts of natural kind, two particulars belong to a natural
kind when they share a cluster of properties (this is highly simplified). Ruth Millikan,
for example, is one of the philosophers who defend this view (2017, 11-26). The view
itself admits philosophical complexity, though, what matters is that we have resources
to reinterpret the causal power subset view.
Instead of clusters of causal powers, we mobilize clusters of properties. Consider an
ordinary object: the pen I have in my hand right now is both blue, point-shaped, 10 cm
in length, so on and on. An object like this is complex, as it is instantiating more than
one property. Now, properties can play the role that causal powers are supposed to play.
The causal power subset schema can be re-formulated as follow.
Let S be a cluster of special scientific properties, while P1, P2 … Pn each be a cluster of
physical properties, such that S is multiply realized in the Ps:
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(CPS1’) Both S and the Ps are each associated with a non-empty and unique set of
properties.
(CPS2’) The set of properties associated with S is a non-empty proper subset of
the set of properties associated with P1, with P2 … and with Pn. In other words, the
set of properties associated with S is the intersection set of the sets of properties
associated with P1, P2…, and Pn.
(CPS3’) The set of properties associated with each Pn is different from the set of
properties associated with any other Pn. No set of properties associated with any
Pn is a subset of the properties associated with any other Pn.
(CPS4’) Necessarily, whenever any Pn is instantiated, S is instantiated.
(CPS5’) Whenever an S is instantiated, all of the properties associated with S are
token identical to a property associated with S’s realizing Pn.
To avoid repetition, I shall not evaluate this schema with the four desiderata. Though, I
shall highlight that this reformulation of the causal power subset account of realization
has retained the gist of the original account. For, as I see it, the gist of the causal power
subset account lies in its denial of the complete heterogeneity of the realizers by
allowing the realizers to be partially similar and partially different. The role of causal
power is only an elaborated story on how such partial similarity is possible. Causal
power is not essential to the strategy. We can, as I have shown, offer a different account
of how partial similarities between realizers are possible.
Concluding Remarks
To sum up:
First, I have argued that the gist of the causal power subset account of multiple
realization is to allow for partial similarities and partial differences among the realizers,
and that the realized picks out the partial commonalities among the realizers. Allowing
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partial similarities suggests an interesting proposal to resolve the tension of Multiplicity
and Naturalness, as raised by Kim.
Second, I have argued that the causal power subset account of multiple realization fails
to make sense of Physical Realization and Anti-Reductionism at the same time. Though,
I argued that the causal power subset account is hinting at a representational reading of
Anti-Reductionism, according to which our seeming commitment to a realized property
is, in fact, a partial representation of the realizers. I carry this suggestion into the next
chapter.
Third, I have argued that the very idea of causal power plays only a minor role in the
causal power subset account of multiple realization. The causal power theory is nothing
but an elaboration on how things could be partially similar and different. Causal power
is not part of the gist of the causal power subset account of multiple realization.
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Chapter 6 Multiple Realization: Representationalism
The Journey
Where have we been to, and where are we now? The central motivation of the thesis is
to make sense of multiple realization, originated with the considerations that there are
multiple ways for something to have a mind, and multiple ways for something to be a
mousetrap.

The

philosophical

fuss

over

these

somewhat

commonsensical

considerations had then developed into a jungle of entangled complications, with
difficult philosophical issues intermingled.
My way of making sense of multiple realization is to evaluate different accounts of
multiple realization, as to whether the accounts could do all of the philosophical tasks
we want multiple realization to do, in a philosophically satisfying way. Most notably,
we want Multiplicity, Naturalness, Physical Realization, and Anti-Reductionism to be
respected. We have seen in the last three chapters that the task is difficult. Fodor fails to
make sense of Physical Realization; Kim argues that it is difficult to uphold Naturalness;
The causal power subset theorists fail to make genuine sense of Anti-Reductionism and
Physical Realization at the same time.
In chapter 5, I argued that the causal power subset account of multiple realization
nudges us toward a representational understanding of Anti-Reductionism, according to
which our seeming commitment to the higher level realized property is in fact a partial
description/representation of the complex physical world. I take this cue seriously and
consider the proposal that multiple realization is a phenomenon primarily about our
ways of representing the complex world. I shall develop this line of thought in this final
chapter.
That multiple realization has something to do with our ways of representation might
first appear radical and reactionary. Usually, it is assumed that multiple realization
concerns worldly phenomena, that it concerns the very relations between different
levels of reality (Consider the common kind of saying: “the higher level properties are
realized by the lower level properties”). I shall admit that the project of developing a
completely satisfactory representational account of multiple realization requires more
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detailed philosophical works than anything I could incorporate in this chapter. My aim
in this chapter is therefore much less ambitious. I only aim at sketching a picture of a
representational account of multiple realization, elaborating it and drawing connections
to part of the existing literature, and by doing so, explicating its plausibility against its
seeming radicalness.
The Basic Picture
To put it in its simplest way, the representational account of multiple realization takes
multiple realization to be a phenomenon in which a representational agent is switching
between a finer way of representing and a coarse-grained way of representing multiple
partially similar and partially different complex fundamental events. When the finer
way of representation is adopted, the fundamental events are counted as different, for,
the partial differences are emphasized. And when the coarse-grained way of
representation is adopted, the fundamental events are counted as the same, for, the
partial similarities are picked out and emphasized. The switch between such ways of
representation is what backing the common multiple realization connotation that
something is “same but different”.
Let’s illustrate the basic picture with a toy example. Suppose in front of us are two
fundamental (and presumably physical) events involving two fundamental (and
presumably physical) objects, a and b. Object a has fundamental (and presumably
physical) properties F, and G, and object b has fundamental (and presumably physical)
properties G, and H. Suppose we are adopting a coarse-grained way of representing the
two events and represent both objects as such that they are G. We have focused solely
on their sharing of property G and disregard, in our way of representation, their sharing
of other properties. We then see sameness in them. We count them as the same kind of
object. Suppose we are not happy with such incomplete representation and adopt the
finer, but more accurate way of representation, such that we represent the events in a
completely accurate manner. We say: object a has property F, G, and b has property G,
H. We then see differences in them. We count them as different kinds of objects. The
seemingly contradictory multiple realization claim that a and b are “same but different”,
then, is explained as such: a and b are “same according to the coarse-grained way of
representation, but different according to the finer way of representation”.
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The aforementioned is a rough sketch of what a multiple realization phenomenon is.
The picture will now be elaborated.
The Basic Picture Elaborated
That multiple realization is a phenomenon in which a representational agent is
switching between a finer way of representing and a coarse-grained way of
representing multiple types of partially similar and partially different complex
fundamental (and presumably physical) events requires elaboration. I shall elaborate
the picture piece by piece, starting from the final part of the claim.
Consider first “events” in “complex fundamental (and presumably physical) events”.
For the sake of simplicity, I assume a Kimmean notion of event (see chapter 3),
according to which an event consists of an object instantiating a/some
property/properties, at a given period. When I make such an assumption, it does not
mean that the picture I am after is necessarily tied to an ontology of events, nor,
particularly, a Kimmean notion of event. Also, my picture is not necessarily tied to the
rather popular “Substance-Attribute” view according to which the world consists of
objects having properties. This move is purely for illustrative purposes.40
Next, consider the phrase “complex” in “complex fundamental (and presumably
physical) events”. That multiple realization requires there be a complex thing has its
roots in the causal power subset strategy as discussed in the previous chapter. One of
the reasons we need complexity is that with it, we can talk about partial similarities and
partial differences. An event where there are two fundamental objects each with one and
only one fundamental property makes no room for partial similarity and difference.
Either the two objects are different, or they are similar (with respect to that single
property they have). 41 Only two complex events can admit partial similarity and
I am open to the possibility that my picture of multiple realization is compatible with more “revisionary”
types of metaphysical theories. Examples of revisionary metaphysics include Shamik Dasgupta’s (2009),
where he would like to work out a theory without individuals, or Terry Horgan and Matjaž Potrč’s
Monism (2000), according to which there is just one object, i.e. the entire universe.
40

Here I shall drop the assumed abundant conception of property. For, the assumption was made to ease
my discussion of the multiple realization literature, where philosophers have been used to talk about
41
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difference, by sharing some, but not all of the features defining the complexity.
Complexity may be defined rigorously and mathematically, though, here I rely just on
the following approximation: An event is complex if and only if the object(s) at issue
has more than one fundamental property.
Complexity is also required for our switch between a finer way and a coarse-grained
way of representation. Only with a complex event could we represent the event in a
coarse-grained way that “leaves something out”. If we have a non-complex event, say,
a fundamental object instantiating one and only one fundamental property, it does not
admit a less-than-perfect representation. I believe that the idea of complexity could aptly
characterize the domain of interest traditionally linked with the multiple realization
literature, i.e. the special sciences. Typical examples of multiple realization that are
found in the special sciences, say, something being in pain, something being a jade,
some societies being in so and so economic state, are all complex events in a broad
sense. Take a piece of jade. As a complex object with more than one micro-physical
constituents and with each having at least one fundamental property,42 the piece of jade
is at least composed of more than one fundamental property.
Consider next “fundamental” in “complex fundamental (and presumably physical)
events”. An event is fundamental if and only if the object(s) and property/properties at
issue of the event is/are fundamental. Why emphasizing a fundamental event instead of
a physical event? The reason is that fundamentality captures more nicely the picture of
multiple realization I am after. I take multiple realization as a partial representation of
the fundamental reality. It is a “flat” world, a world without “levels” (more on this later).
Hence, by not using the phrase “physical” in characterizing our fundamental events, my
picture remains neutral on the following two questions: whether there is a non-trivial
and interesting notion of “physical” (cf: footnote 2), and whether fundamental reality is
entirely physical.

disjunctive property. In contrast, the picture I am sketching in this chapter relies on a sparse theory of
property, according to which the only existing properties are both fundamental and non-disjunctive.
Here I am assuming there are composite object. Compositional nihilists may recast my example in
their terms without any lost.
42
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But what, then, is fundamentality? This is yet another intriguing but difficult question.
Here again, I admit I don’t have a rigorous definition of fundamentality. Though, the
following rough characterization may help. Take any object, there must be a maximally
comprehensive, fully determinate, non-redundant, and non-disjunctive way/ways the
thing is. This is how the thing is, fundamentally. If the characterization is too esoteric
to be useful, then let’s take fundamentality to be a primitive notion, for the sake of
continuing our sketch of the picture of multiple realization.
My account of multiple realization is compatible with a full-fledged version of
physicalism, i.e. the claim that, whatever there is, is physical. The realizers, i.e. the
fundamental events, can be entirely physical. My account of multiple realization does
not have higher level realized things standing in some relation to the fundamental things.
Our seeming commitment to the higher level, non-fundamental realized things is
nothing but our partial representation of a complex fundamental event. If fundamental
reality is entirely physical, then everything is physical, for, I presume no “higher level”
non-fundamental things on top of that of the fundamental.43
To illustrate, consider the market crash in 2020. Do we have one thing, the non-physical
market crash, and another thing, the physical state of our earth as of 2020 that stands in
some kind of a realization relation? Under my picture of multiple realization, no. Saying
that the physical state is a market crash is to adopt a partial representation of that very
same physical state. It introduces no extra non-physical thing, a market crash, into the
physical reality.
Now I move backward to the phrase “multiple types of” in “represented multiple types
of partially similar and partially different complex fundamental (and presumably
physical) events”. We need multiple fundamental events at issue in order to turn it into
a case of multiple realization. This is uncontroversial. It is always assumed that there
are multiple realizers given multiple realization. Pain has multiple realizers. Market

One may think that the notion of fundamentality presumes that there are “levels”. Some philosophers,
Karen Bennett for example (2017), even analyzes fundamentality in terms of notions that involve the
metaphysical dependence relations between the levels. Again, I shall not dive into the problem. If
fundamentality is not the best word to characterize a flat world, we could just drop it.
43
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crash is multiply realized by the fundamental state in March 2020, by the fundamental
state in August 2008, and so forth.
The “partially similar and partially different” in “represented multiple types of partially
similar and partially different complex fundamental (and presumably physical) events”
should already be familiar by now. To repeat, with two complex events being partially
similar in respect to some features while being partially similar in respect to some other
features, we can count the events as of the same kind if we focus on their similarities,
and we can also count the events as of different kinds if we focus on their differences.
Now I turn to the notion of representation, which is the essential building block to
“representational agent” and “ways of representing” in my account of multiple
realization. The problem concerning the nature of representation is extremely
controversial among philosophers. I shall sidestep such controversies and rely on an
intuitive notion of representation that has been ingrained in our common senses. My
belief that p represents the world as such that it is p. A thermometer represents the
temperature of the room.44 A map tells us about the location of the city. I hope that
examples like these are sufficient to show that representation is basic in our everyday
practices and that it is difficult to characterize representation without the use of the very
notion of “representation”, at least in such intuitive characterization.45
My use of “ways of representation”, “switching between fine-grained and coarsegrained ways of representation”, and “representational agent” relies on an elaboration
on the notion of representation. Consider first “ways of representation”, it appears
obvious to me that if we are to represent something, we must represent it in a certain
way. Given an event, there are multiple ways for us to represent it, with various degrees
of exactness. Given a mountain landscape, I can either take a photo with it, or draw a
pencil sketch, or I can represent what I have seen linguistically with a “Lo, a mountain”,
or a more detailed description, “a mountain with so and so specification”. A Google

Comparing a human being’s representation with a thermometer is inspired by Mark Wilson’s (1982).
Wilson’s view is much more complicated, but I shall not dig into the matter.
44

In fact, some philosophers argue that a reductive account of representation is futile. See for example
Tim Crane’s (2013), chapter 12.
45
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map represents how the city is in a much-detailed way than a traditional tourist map
does. The two maps are then two ways of representing how the city is.
The above characterization of “ways of representation” has already hinted at the “switch”
between such ways of representation, and that different ways of representation can be
more or less finely grained and coarsely grained. Concerning the switch between ways
of representation, it seems obvious to me that human beings are cognitively flexible to
switch between ways of representation, as characterized by the previous mundane
example with the mountain. Consciously or unconsciously, we switch to different ways
of representation as a result of multiple factors of the situation. A pencil sketch takes
more time but may be more aesthetically satisfying than a quick shot with a smartphone.
One feature of human beings is that we can learn new ways to represent the world.
Hence, not only do we adopt multiple ways to represent an event, but we are also
capable of discovering and learning new, and sometimes more accurate ways to
represent the events. This, however, is nothing but the banal fact that we made progress
in understanding the world, in both scientific and mundane settings. Borrowing an
example from Philip Kitcher, an inexperienced biology student needs to learn how to
see patterns in even very mundane field observation. Consider observing a baboon troop
going about their business. To the inexperienced, the baboons are just doing random
stuff, sitting and walking over here and there. Nothing but limited representation can be
given. To the experienced, however, patterns, for example, grooming behavior, can be
perceived, individual of baboon can be identified, meaningful discrimination can be
made, etc (Kitcher 1993, 222-223).
I also take it to be obvious that these different ways of representation vary with respect
to how detailed it represents the target event. Some ways of representation are more
fine-grained, while some are more abstract and leave out much of the information about
the event. Consider again the mountain example. In most circumstances, a photo is
always a more fine-grained way of representation of the mountain than the linguistic
representation “Lo, a mountain”. (It does not mean that a linguistic representation is
always more coarse-grained than a pictorial representation). Returning to the toy
example where we have an object o with just two properties: F and G. One way to
represent the object (linguistically), is to say that “o is F”; another way to represent the
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object is to say that “o is F and o is G”. Clearly, the second way of representation
communicates more information about o than the first way of representation. From such
consideration, one feature of the relation between a fine-grained way of representation
and a coarse-grained way of representation (of the same target event) is that the former
must contain more information (about the target event) than the latter.46
Here I add that a more detailed representation may not be the one to be preferred, given
that we have limited cognitive power. We are not gods, representation costs us energy.
Typically, a more detailed representation costs more energy and time, rendering it a less
efficient way to handle the information of an event. We face a trade-off between
efficiency and accuracy in representing the world,47 as Daniel Dennett puts:
Would we prefer an extremely compact pattern description with a high noise ratio
or a less compact pattern description with a lower noise ratio? Our decision may
depend on how swiftly and reliably we can discern the simple pattern, how
dangerous errors are, how much of our resources we can afford to allocate to
detection and calculation.
(Dennett 1991, 36)

In their (1999), after offering a lengthy review of how neurological researches are, and have been,
highly relevant to psychological research (hence objecting multiple realization theorists’ contentions that
neurology and psychology are rather independent from each other), William Bechtel and Jennifer
Mundale complain that part of the reason why philosophers always find multiple realization plausible,
and find it everywhere, is that they had “employed different grains of analysis in identifying
psychological states and brain states, using a coarse grain to identify psychological states and a fine grain
to differentiate brain states” (1999, 202) Given the switch between different “grain”, it is very easy to
find a “same but different” cases. I believe that their observation is correct. It is just that what they take
as a complaint, I take it as the feature of multiple realization. It is the switch that gives us the multiple
realization considerations and intuitions.
46

Given the tradeoff and the pragmatics of finding the sweet spot given such a tradeoff, I do not agree
with Hilary Putnam’s contention that a more generalized explanation must be preferred over a less
generalized one. In defending the autonomy of our “mental life”, Putnam argues that psychological
theories are autonomous because the explanation they provide are objectively superior to physical
theories in the sense that the psychological theories leaving out irrelevant details and hence being more
general. Putnam illustrates the point by considering a very simple physical setup, in which a rigid peg
passes through a square hole but not a round hole (1975a, 295). To explain why the peg behaves as it
does, we have an explanation couched in terms of atoms and fundamental forces (Putnam 1975a, 295).
But, as Putnam argues, we have an objectively superior explanation if we leave out the details and focus
on higher level features that are relevant (Putnam 1975a, 296), in which case, it is the shape, size, and
rigidity of the peg and the holes. Putnam further believes that the relevancy of the explanation secures its
autonomy.
47

I believe Putnam is slightly over tilted to value generality over accuracy in model choice. I have
reservations on whether a more general explanation must be objectively superior to the less general one.
There exists a trade-off between accuracy/precision and generality. Whether one model or explanation is
superior to the other, although not subjective (which I agree with Putnam), is a highly contextual matter.
What feature count as relevant in a situation also depends on where our interest lies. If we want to explain
why the peg pass through the hole in exactly that way via exactly that trajectory, fundamental physical
features of the system are relevant, and Putnam’s preferred explanation fails to explain in this case.
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Now consider the phrase “representational agent” in my account. Since I rely on an
intuitive notion of representation, I do not have in my mind a verdict on how to draw
the line between representational agents and non-representational agents. I shall leave
the thorny issue aside and take us, human beings, as a typical case of a representational
agent. That we are able to represent the world and represent the world in certain ways,
and that we are able to switch between more or less exact ways of representing the world,
appears to me obvious. Since multiple realization is mainly a concern of philosophers,
and philosophers appear to be human beings, I have focused on how we, human beings,
find ourselves in multiple realization situations.
I believe that the aforementioned characterization of representation, ways of
representation, and our switches between such ways of representation are nothing but
rudimentary and superficial. The deep story about how we are able to represent the
world should be elaborated with the input of empirical findings that looks at our
cognitive makeup and its functioning. That how the “switch between ways of
representation” actually happens in our fundamental (and presumably physical) makeup
is also an empirical issue. Clearly, this is a very complicated story, and it is beyond my
knowledge and capacity to recite here even a portion of the full picture of human
cognition.
This exemplifies how I am relying on a very coarse-grained way of representation to
represent representation, given my lack of knowledge of the details of the situation.
Though, I believe that the aforementioned sketch is intuitive enough to characterize a
representational account of multiple realization.
The Four Desiderata Again
Given my sketch of a representational account of multiple realization, I return to our
good old four desiderata. How well does my representational account score? Let’s recall
and consider each in turn.
Multiplicity. There are at least two realizers P for any multiply realized property S.
That the realizing properties Ps are different from each other.
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Naturalness. That the realized property S is a natural property.
Physical Realization. That S is physically realized by, and hence nothing over and
above the Ps.
Anti-Reductionism. That S is not reducible to the Ps.
Multiplicity is being respected by the stipulation that in a multiple realization situation,
multiple types of partially similar and partially different complex events are at issue.
That they are partially different respects what we want from Multiplicity. My account
does not differ from the causal power subset view in this regard.
Naturalness, however, has to be denied. Naturalness requires us to make sense of the
claim that the higher level realized property is natural. However, in the representational
account of multiple realization, I posit no such thing as a higher level realized property.
It does not make sense, under the account, to ask whether the realized property is natural
or not.
Though giving up Naturalness, more can be said about it. Recall that a central question
surrounding the problem of naturalness is whether the physical things under
consideration are similar or not. And there is an answer according to the representational
account. The representational account requires the target events (the realizers) to be
partially similar, making the realizers similar at least in some respects. This is the insight
we learned from the causal power subset view of realization, and the representational
account now sketched has well preserved this feature.
One of the motivations for Naturalness is that the realizers are similar enough to count
as a natural kind. My representational account does respect such motivation. It is only
that what makes for the similarities among the realizers are fundamental properties,
instead of higher level properties.
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One may question how many similarities are sufficient for naturalness: how similar two
things need to be, for them to be counted as belonging to a natural kind?48 I don’t think
that there is a definite answer to the question. Whether two things are similar enough to
count as a natural kind depends not only on how many similarities they share
quantitatively, but also on how we are to weigh those similarities. Practical and
pragmatic consideration comes into play when concerning the latter. As Quine has
observed, when discussing how our classificatory scheme is sharpened by scientific
progress, “we retain different similarity standards, different systems of kinds, for use in
different contexts.” (Quine 1969, 129).
Representing a Jadeite stone and a Nephrite stone both as jade, counting the two
chemically different stones as belonging to a single kind, jade, maybe good enough for
quite a lot of circumstances. Though dissimilar in chemical structure, their sharing of
similar “superficial properties” like color, texture, commercial value, and the like, are
important enough for a 19th-century merchant to adopt the jade way of representation
to represent the stones in his inventory. That similarity comes in degree and that our
standard of similarity is continuously changing make the notion of naturalness a less
definite and absolute matter. Under some circumstances in which a lower standard of
similarity is running, like the one in which we found our 19th-century merchant, a
Jadeite stone and a Nephrite stone are similar enough to be represented as a single
natural kind.49
Recall this is the question that has bewitched us when Kim requires that the similarities have to be
significant, to count for naturalness. This is also the question the causal power subset theorists have
sidestepped.
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The fuss over Jade in contemporary philosophy is very interesting. Though, I can only make a brief
comment. According to the standard story of jade, before the advance of modern science, the ancient
treated both Jadeite and Nephrite as belonging to one kind, jade, for both Jadeite Nephrite stones, despite
chemical differences, share lots of “superficial similarities”. With modern knowledge, we learn that jade
is composed of two “natural kinds”, Jadeite and Nephrite, hence, jade turns out not to be a natural kind.
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Jade is made famous in the philosophy literature by Putnam’s (1975b), “the meaning of meaning”.
Though, it is worth mentioning that Putnam’s concern in the work, and his uses of the example of jade,
is at a distance away from how jade is used in the multiple realization literature.
That Jade is not a natural kind (because Jadeite and Nephrite do not share “deep” similarities) is what
Françoise Longy called “a platitude”, and that, to his knowledge, no “natural kind realist” denies this
claim (2018, 1465-1466). Kim’s use of the example of Jade in his (1992) is exactly relying on the
consensus that jade is not a natural kind.
There are two issues worth mentioning. First, as I have mentioned in the main text, I am discontent with
the agenda of drawing any sharp distinction between superficial similarities and deep similarities, as in
the case of jade. Second, the history of human being’s affair with jade is much complicated than anything
that could be captured by the slogan “jade is not a natural kind”. When the claim is taken as a platitude,
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How about the other benchmark of naturalness: projectability and law? I am neutral as
to whether naturalness, as I have understood as a notion in terms of similarity making,
is necessarily tied to the notion of lawhood. If the linkage is insisted, I would be happy
to admit such a constraint into my picture. I then would require that the partial
similarities the events share, i.e. the common fundamental properties that they share,
are properties that play a role in a law. Our representations then are roughly capturing
the lawful regularities instantiated by the similarity-making properties exhibited in the
events at issue.50
Now I turn to Physical Realization. The motivation for Physical Realization is that
multiple realization theorists are self-claimed physicalists and that they would like their
account to be compatible with physicalism. The representational account fully respects
the tradition. It respects Physical Realization by being compatible with the simple claim
that everything is such that it is entirely physical. What I call a fundamental event can
be entirely physical. Suppose that fundamental reality is entirely physical, unlike most
of the accounts of realization, I do not postulate any non-physical, higher level, realized
properties, which, in turn, are connected back to the physical realizing properties in a
“realization” relation. Although I cannot account for how the higher level realized
property is “physically nothing over and above” (for, there is no such thing as higher
level realized property), my account fully respects what motivates Physical Realization
at first: Physicalism.
The price I have to pay for, in allowing such a strong form of physicalism, is that AntiReductionism no longer survives. Since I postulate no higher level realized property, I
cannot endorse the claim that the realized property is not reducible to the realizing
property. Though, I could explain, and thereby could respect the considerations that
motivate Anti-Reductionism: that our talk about higher level things seems so inevitable.
I endorse the claim that it is hard for us to give up descriptions and representations that

it brushes off an otherwise interesting philosophical issue arising from a complicated story. For a less
dogmatic treatment of jade, see chapter 4 of Joseph Laporte’s (2004) and Ian Hacking’s (2007). Both
contains a detailed report of how the stones have been treated in our actual history.
Note that what is exhibited in the law is not the disjunction of the partially different and partially similar
events. For, as argued in chapter 5, even with partial similarities, a disjunction is not projectable.
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seemingly postulate higher level entities. It is practically impossible to replace all
special scientific sentences and our talk over chairs and tables with that of the sentences
in fundamental physics. Here I am on par with a typical anti-reductionist. But the reason
why it is hard to give up these higher level talks is purely epistemological, not
ontological.51 It is not because there exist higher level properties that a higher level talk
is needed. The reason we find such partial representation inevitable and hard to avoid
is that we have limited energy and cognitive capacity to handle the complex world, that
it is inevitable for us, limited beings, to abstract away from most of the details of the
world, for practical reasons.
I don’t think that the price of giving up Anti-Reductionism is too high, since the status
of special sciences, as well as that of our commonsense world view, can be well secured,
even if there is no such thing as higher level properties holding a multiply realized
relation to the fundamental world. At least, the representational account preserves this
intuition that in part motivated Anti-Reductionism. Special sciences are valuable and
indispensable for epistemological reasons. And epistemological reasons are good
enough reasons for us limited being to retain the status of the special sciences and
common sense.
In chapter 2, I said that the thesis is to look for an account of multiple realization that
could make best sense of the four desiderata. But I also said that the journey of looking
after an account of multiple realization would in turn illuminate the desiderata
themselves. I hope my thesis by now shows that the dialectic is clear enough. The
various accounts we have looked at score differently when compared with the four
desiderata. All the accounts we have looked at fail in fully satisfying the desiderata. The
same fate befalls my preferred account: Anti-Reductionism and Naturalness are
purposefully dropped.
At this stage of the thesis, three urgent questions remain.52 First, given the failure in
arriving at a satisfactory account of multiple realization, can we conclude that no such

As mentioned, I am not alone. Lenny Clapp also defends such epistemological reading of the “NonReductive” part of Non-Reductive Physicalism (2001).
51

52

Credit is given to Peter Hawke and Colin Klein in pushing forward these questions in the examination.
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account is to be found? Second, given that all the considered accounts fail in some
respect, why prefer my representational one? Third, given that my account is an
eliminativist one, can I say that it is an account of multiple realization? These are
important questions. The answers I could offer are but brief and provisional, given that
they intermingled with complicated issues.
For the first question, I am inclined to think that a satisfactory account of multiple
realization is not forthcoming. The more accounts we have looked at, the more
understanding we gain with respect to the four desiderata. The tension among the
desiderata becomes clear as well. This gives us reason to think that no such account can
be found, since the desiderata themselves are motivated by conflicting intuitions.
That there exist no account of multiple realization satisfying all desiderata does not
deprive the value of the search: we, after all, have arrived at a clearer view on the
tensions between the desiderata, the reason why they are in tension, and a fresh
perspective on how different account of multiple realizations are related. We end up
with four desiderata in tensions, and a list of “imperfect” accounts of multiple
realization to be chosen.
So, the second question asks, why choose a representational account instead of, say
Fodor’s account? To this question I have two answers: the representational account can
be regarded as an outcome of a dialectical process. It is my reflective equilibrium
reached after considering various accounts. We move from Fodor, Kim, to the causal
power subset theorists, each account attempts to fix the bugs of the previous one, while
preserving the insights. This, at least, is how I see the dialectical development in the
multiple realization literature. The second answer to the question is that the
representational account is the only one that has a light-weighted ontology. All three
accounts considered, Fodor’s account, Kim’s account, and the account of the causal
power subset theorists are ontologically committed to higher level properties.
Ontological parsimony, therefore, is a reason one could opt for the representational
account. Why, then, prefer parsimony instead of abundance? To this, I have no further
justification or comment to offer, as it touches upon fundamental questions in
metaphysics that are beyond the scope of the thesis.
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Turning to the third question: can there be an eliminativist theory of multiple realization?
Given that there is no higher level realized property, and hence, no realization relation
between higher level properties and lower level properties, how can this theory still be
a theory of multiple realization? I don’t have a clear verdict on this issue. I don’t know
whether having a notion of multiple realization requires there be multiply realized
properties, just as I don’t know whether an eliminative theory of mind count as a theory
of mind. Though, the following consideration may help. My account takes into
consideration the phenomena that multiple realization theorists think are instances of
multiple realization: Jade the stones, Pain the mental states, etc. To these phenomena I
respond that there exists no higher level property, hanging beyond and above the
fundamental properties. Jade and pain are not addition of being to reality. But my picture
consists of more than a mere rejection of higher level entities: I respect and aim at
explaining the seeming that there exist such higher level properties. I take into
consideration the phenomenon of multiple realization theorists’ standing in a
representational relation to Jade and Pain. I further explain why it seems to us that there
exists multiply realized property, given our cognitive make-up and our way of
representing a complex world. Is this picture a “theory of multiple realization”, or an
“elimination of multiple realization”? Or is it just a matter of verbal dispute? I am
tempted not to take side. Instead, I answer: here is a picture of what is happening when
philosophers talk about multiple realization, just look at it!
Connection to the Multiple Realization Literature: Klein’s (2008)
A representational account of multiple realization should sound radical and revisionary.
In the multiple realization literature, it is always assumed that both the higher level
realized property and the lower level realizing property are real. The only problem is
how we are to relate the two. I have little to say in defense of the representational
account from the charge of radicalness. For, I believe our diverged verdict may have
something to do with a more fundamental problem concerning reality: whether reality
comes in different “levels”, or “layers” (more on this in the final section of this chapter).
Though, to at least mitigate this radicalness charge, I draw a connection to the existing
multiple realization literature. In particular, I look at Colin Klein’s (2008), in which
Klein argues that many multiply realized kind terms are better understood as picking
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out not real kind in reality, but useful idealized models that “are mere possibila”. I
contend that Klein’s (2008) shares the same spirit, though not the details, with the
representational account of multiple realization sketched so far.
Klein emphasizes the ubiquitous use of idealized models in the special sciences. What
is an idealized model? Despite meaning variances of “model”, two general features of
scientific models, abstraction and idealization, are typically acknowledged (GodfreySmith 2016, 21). The abstraction characterization refers to the fact the models leave
details out of mention, and the idealization characterization refers to the fact that models
use literally false but useful simplifications about the event at issue. My emphasis on
partial representation maps well into the feature of abstraction, while Klein is
emphasizing more on the feature of idealization. Though, in many cases, a model is
both idealized and abstract, in the sense that it both leaves out details and contains useful
misinformation.53
Klein attempts to solve the dispute over multiple realization by taking multiply realized
kinds not to be real scientific kinds, but idealized models that “do not purport to describe
the world” (2008, 171). This way we could avoid committing to the existence of widely
heterogeneous kinds, which, as argued by Kim, is non-natural. Klein’s picture, albeit
somewhat simplified, is that the lower level, more “basic” sciences, are discovering and
committing to the existence of natural kind, and the special sciences are in the business
of making up idealized model, without committing to the existence of a higher level
multiply realized natural kind.
In a broad sense, I am on the same boat as Klein. We are both taking an anti-realist
stance toward the seemingly existing higher level realized property. Treating higher
levels kind as models is very similar to treating them as representations. The term
“Model” picks out the vehicle in which we represent, while the term “representation”
picks out the act of representing with a vehicle. The distinction may only be
grammatical, as we are very used to the idea that we use a model to “model” reality.
It is an interesting question whether the two notions, abstractness and idealization, can be reduced to a
generalized notion, something like distance from perfect accuracy, in terms of the quantitative amount of
information being carried by the model/representation about the target. I shall not dig into the detail of
the problem, for, it is a topic beyond my competence. This is inspired in part by Dennett’s non-technical
uses of the notion “information” in his (1991).
53
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Though, on the following points, I part with Klein.
First, Klein states that people using idealized models never “purport to describe the
world” (2008, 171). Since idealized models are “mere possibilia” the models are “false
of anything in the actual world”, and that “you can’t use them to predict anything”
(Klein 2008, 173). The characterization appears to me too strong. The fact that we
intentionally make idealization when picturing reality does not entail that we are not
intending to describe the world with that impoverished (but useful) model. We describe
the world imperfectly with an idealized model. For example, an economic model may
depict human beings as a perfect rational utility maximizer, which seems to be an
idealized characterization of human beings. Though, economists do think that the model
describes and predicts human behavior pretty well. It is through this model that market
behaviors are deduced and predicted.54
The reason why Klein is making such strong claims about idealized models, I contend,
is that he is drawing a sharp distinction between scientific endeavors that commit to the
discovering of real kinds in the actual world from scientific endeavors that do not have
such commitment. And the reason for drawing such a sharp distinction is that he wants
to respect Kim’s contention that the “widely-heterogeneous multiple realization kind”
are not real, and are not natural kinds, at all. Since idealized models are nothing but
mere possibilia, it does not purport to reveal any natural kind in the actual world.
This leads to my second part with Klein’s (2008). I believe Klein’s attempt to draw a
sharp distinction between “idealized model” and “actual description”, such that there is
no middle ground, is erred. The fact that some models are quite abstract and inaccurate
may give us the false impression that every idealized model fails to describe the actual
world. However, models differ in degree of accuracy and precision, there is no point in
emphasizing a sharp distinction separating the “idealized” model that does not describe
the actual world at all from the non-idealized one that does describe the world. There is
a lot of middle ground between a fully actual model and a purely idealized or fictitious
model. It is in this middle ground that many special sciences models dwell.
Here I shall back myself with a casual observation from the introduction chapter of a textbook on
microeconomics. The authors of the textbook compare economic models with a map, which they think
“is a representation of reality that is simplified and abstract” (Case, Fair, and Oster 2017, 41).
54
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In fact, there are elements in Klein’s work that would undermine his sharp boundary.
When elaborating on how scientists work with an idealized model, he says that idealized
models are usually being elaborated by “progressively” adding back the “complexity
left out at the beginning” (2008, 173). If “actual” elements are added to the supposedly
non-actual idealized model progressively, what is the status of the model in this
intermediate state, before the model is considered fully actual? Is this still an idealized
model? How many “complexities” are needed to be added, if one wants to turn an
idealized model actual? These difficulties arise only if we assume there is no middle
ground between a fully idealized model and a fully actual description.
This leads to my third and final objection to Klein’s view. Based on the aforementioned
sharp distinction between idealized models that pick out mere possibilia and actual
descriptions that pick out a real natural kind, Klein characterizes multiply realized kinds
with the former and the realizing kind with the latter. Take a typical example in the
multiple realization literature, being in pain is said to be multiply realized by various
brain states. According to Klein’s picture, “pain” picks out an idealized model, while
“brain states” pick out real natural kinds. Since “brain state” is not an idealized model,
it cannot itself be a multiply realized kind, being multiply realized by more basic
physical states. But multiple realization theorists usually admit that a realizing kind can
itself be a multiply realized kind realized by various lower level physical states (Kim,
1992, 8). Klein’s picture fails to make sense of it.
In contrast, if we give up the sharp distinction between idealized model and actual
description, we could make sense of the claim that a brain state, albeit being a realizing
kind in relation to mental state, itself can be a multiply realized kind in relation to more
basic physical states. The trick is to, as has been pursued so far, understand the multiple
realization situation in which we are switching from a less detailed representation
(model) to a relatively more detailed one. In this case, both mental states and brain states
can all be thought to be models, but differ in accuracy and precision. We can then make
sense of the consensus that multiple realizing kinds can also be itself realized: that the
many levels of realized and realization relation is actually our switch from a more
detailed representation to less and less detailed representations.
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A Bigger Picture
I close my sketch of the representational account of multiple realization by taking a
broader perspective, locating the account into a bigger picture.
One intuitive picture about reality is that reality is leveled: at the bottom we have the
physical stuff, building on top we have chemical stuff, biological stuff, social stuff, and
so on, one stacked on top of the next. John Heil calls this picture “level of reality” (Heil
2003), while Kim calls it the “layered model” (Kim 2002). More recently, Karen
Bennett comes up with a new metaphor, that reality is like a “branching tree” (Bennett
2017, 237). The lower level things are “building”, in a metaphysical sense that Bennett
developed in her (2017), the higher level things. This is scala naturae, the Great Chain
of Being of modern times.55 The leveled picture is deeply ingrained in contemporary
philosophy that backs many philosophical issues. What is the relation between the
special sciences and fundamental physics? Can one be reduced to the other? How about
reducing the mental states to the brain states? The picture seems so obvious that these
questions are framed in this way: given that there are levels of reality, how are they
related?
I hope it is obvious that the problem of multiple realization assumes the level picture, if
not explicitly. Multiple realization is supposed to give us one reasonable view
concerning how the special sciences are related to the physical sciences, how the higher
level is tied to the lower level. I take the representation account, in which higher level
things are taken only as a representation, as part of the agenda in rejecting the deeply
ingrained level picture of reality. The fact that we have an economic model does not
mean that there is a level of economic reality lying above the physical (or, fundamental)
reality. Our economic theories and sentences are partial representations, imperfect
models, for limited beings like us to deal with an entirely “flat”, but arguably complex
world, a complex world without layers.

One interesting observation is that in the past, the more important beings (e.g. God, the angels) are
placed on the upper end of the ladder, while in the contemporary setting, we are more used to the idea
that the “foundation” and the “ground” (e.g. the physics) are more important. Though, I should emphasize
that this is not a scholarly observation.
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Bennett calls the view that denies the level picture “flat-worldism”, and that, to her mind,
this extreme and radical position has never been defended (2017, 215-216).56 I do not
take the present chapter as a knock-down refutation of the level picture, given the
rudimentary nature of this chapter, and given that the level picture has proliferated so
much and has developed into various sub-issues. What I hope is that the considerations
developed in this chapter do reveal that, at the very least, an alternative picture is
possible. Whether the agenda can be materialized is an interesting issue I shall pursuit
in the future.
Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, I sketch a representational account of multiple realization that I find
plausible. I then look at the four desiderata again. My preferred account needs to drop
Naturalness and Anti-Reductionism, I price I am willing to pay. As a remedy, I attempt
to explain and settle the considerations that backed the two desiderata. I then draw a
connection to Klein’s (2008), a work that shares the same spirit with the representational
account I am after. I discuss my disagreement over some of the details of Klein’s work.
In the end, I locate the representational account in a broader perspective, with its antilevel agenda specified.

Bennett is wrong. It is false that no one has ever rejected the level picture of reality. John Heil is one
of them, see, for example, his (2003) and (2012). Orly Shenker has also recently developed what she calls
“flat-physicalism” in her (2017), where she presents a view that is anti-level in nature. To add, I am on
their side and am sympathetic to their works.
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Chapter 7 Conclusion
What is multiple realization? The reason I ask this question is that multiple realization
has been mobilized to do important philosophical work. Most importantly, multiple
realization is mobilized to illuminate a non-reductive physicalist relation between the
mental and the physical, the special sciences and the physical sciences, and in general,
the higher level and the lower level.
Why is this important question not seriously addressed until recently? One diagnosis is
that multiple realization, at least at its origin, had hinged more on rough considerations
than rigorous definitions, and more on vivid imaginations than rigid formalizations.
When Putnam invited us to imagine how different a physical system can be to run a
computer program, or when Fodor invited us to think about how different the underlying
minuscule physical details can be, for something to count as being in an economic state,
there remains the question of what is truly at stake behind these considerations,
imaginations, and intuitions.
The thesis is a long journey through which I attempt to get clearer on what multiple
realization is, and what our rough considerations are about. I started with a chapter on
methodology. I emphasized and argued for four desiderata that every account of
multiple realization should be able to explicate in a philosophically satisfying way.
Multiplicity requires that the realizers be multiple, Naturalness requires that the realized
property be natural, Physical Realization and Anti-Reductionism requires that the
realized property be both “nothing over and above the physical realizers” but also “notreducible to the physical realizers”. The four desiderata are what we want from any
account of multiple realization. I also emphasized that by the very act of studying
accounts of multiple realization, in turns, illuminates what is truly at stake among the
desiderata.
In chapter 3, I looked at Fodor’s (1974). I worked out his account of multiple realization
in his famous “Special Sciences” and argued that the major bug for his account is his
failure to respect Physical Realization. It is this bug that differentiates his account of
multiple realization from that of Kim.
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In chapter 4, I argued that, against a typical interpretation of the work, Kim’s (1992)
challenge against Fodor relies on his identification of the realized property with the
disjunction of the realizers. Kim further shows that, intentionally, his account of
multiple realization fails to respect Naturalness. This posts a problem for philosophers
who want to save multiple realization.
In chapter 5, I looked at the causal power subset account of realization in chapter 5. It
is an interesting view materializing around the turn of the century. I presented the causal
power subset account of realization, explicating why it is taken as a solution to Kim’s
challenge, how it faces difficulties in making sense of the Physical Realization and AntiReductionism dual, and why the solution has nothing much to do with causal power
after all. I closed the discussion by suggesting that the view nudges us toward a
representational account of multiple realization, with which I find sympathy.
Inspired by the causal power subset view, in chapter 6, I sketched a rough picture
showing how a representational account of multiple realization might look like. The
picture I have arrived at is an anti-realist one, denying the existence of any higher level
properties. By this I have given up Anti-Reductionism and Naturalness, both desiderata
require the existence of higher level properties. At this stage of the thesis, we notice that
the desiderata are in tension, and there are insurmountable difficulties in reconciling all
of them satisfactorily. We end up with different “imperfect” accounts of multiple
realization, including the representational account I sketched. I briefly discussed the
reasons why I prefer mine over the other accounts we have encountered. After that, I
elaborated the representational account and drew some connection to the existing
literature, especially Klein’s (2008). Finally, I connected my discussion to an “anti-level”
agenda in general metaphysics.
The End, also the Future
We have traveled a long journey, but I see the thesis as a midway report. Two points to
note.
First, my preferred representational account of multiple realization is sketched roughly.
To render it a plausible alternative to the received view of multiple realization, the
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picture needs ample refurbishments. This is one big venture to which the thesis may
lead.
Second, the literature I have worked on in this thesis is but a portion of everything that
has been published under the name of multiple realization. The literature is vast, as John
Bickle puts:
The literature on multiple realizability had taken off in numerous varied directions,
and following out any one of these leads one quickly into detailed complicated and
technical discussions, in both philosophy and science, and often at quite a distance
from those who follow out arguments in other directions.
(Bickle 2020)
Recent works in multiple realization, such as Polger and Shapiro’s (2016), and Aizawa
and Gillett’s (2009), lean toward empirical issues. They look carefully at concrete
scientific findings and contest the plausibility or implausibility of multiple realization.
The story developed in the thesis so far has left these recent developments of the
literature unmentioned. Hence, another possible venture for the thesis would then be to
draw a closer connection toward these recent empirically driven works.
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